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Abstract
The resiliency of systems integrated through cyber networks is of utmost importance
due to the reliance on these systems for critical services such as industrial control sys-
tems, nuclear production, and military weapons systems. Current research in cyber
resiliency remains largely limited to methodologies utilizing a singular technique that
is predominantly theoretical with limited examples given. This research uses notional
data in presenting a novel approach to cyber system analysis and network resource
allocation by leveraging multiple techniques including game theory, stochastic pro-
cesses, and mathematical programming. An operational network security problem
consisting of 20 tactical normal form games provides an assessment of the resiliency
of a cyber defender’s network by leveraging the solutions of each tactical game to
inform transitional probabilities of a discrete-time Markov chain over an attacker-
defender state space. Furthermore, the Markov chain provides an assessment of the
conditional path through the operational problem with an expected cost of damage
to the defender network. The solutions of the tactical games and, in turn the oper-
ational problem, are utilized to determine the effects and risks of projected network
improvement resource allocation decisions via an integer program. These results can
be used to inform network analysts of the resiliency of their network while providing
recommendations and requirements for improving their network resiliency posture
against potential malicious external actors.
iv
AFIT-ENS-MS-19-M-133
For my family, friends, and colleagues.
Thank you for for making all of this possible.
v
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Darryl Ahner, for his patience, wisdom, and
guidance throughout the writing of this work. I would also like to thank my family,
friends, colleagues, and professors for taking the time to discuss concepts, provide
feedback, and the constant encouragement from start to finish. None of this would
be possible without all of you.
Michael T. Larkin
vi
Table of Contents
Page
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 History of Cyber Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Cyber Resiliency and Hardening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Challenges in Cyber Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5 Game Theory in Cyber Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6 Discrete-Time Markov Chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
III. Applications in Cyber Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 Normal Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3 Zero Sum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 Mixed Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5 Minmax Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.6 Extensive Form Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
IV. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3 Game Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.4 Discrete Time Markov Chain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.5 Cost Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
vii
Page
4.6 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
V. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.2 State Game Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.3 DTMC Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.4 Cost Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
VI. Conclusions and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
6.2 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Appendix A. Tactical Normal Form State Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Appendix B. Pure and Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Appendix C. Nash Equilibria from Allocation IP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Appendix D. Transition Matrix Partitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Appendix E. Discrete-Time Markov Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Appendix F. Transient State Matrix Partitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Appendix G. Mean Time in Transient State Matrix Partitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Appendix H. Probability of Entering State Matrix Partitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Appendix I. Damage Cost Per State Matrix Partitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Appendix J. MATLAB - Stochastic Game Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Appendix K. MATLAB - Stochastic Game Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Appendix L. LINGO - Integer Program Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
viii
List of Figures
Figure Page
1 Extensive Form Game Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2 Stationary Probabilities Over 40 Time Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3 Stationary Probabilities with Sub-optimal Blue
Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4 Stationary Probabilities with Blue Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5 Stationary Probabilities with Allocation Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
ix
List of Tables
Table Page
1 Prisoner’s Dilemma Normal Form Matrix [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 Normal Form Game Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Zero-Sum Game Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4 Reduced Zero-Sum Game Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5 Revised Zero-Sum Game Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6 Acquisitions Normal Form Game Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7 Induced Normal Form Game Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8 Blue State Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
9 Red State Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
10 Blue Action Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
11 Red Action Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
12 Red Baseline Probabilities of Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
13 Red Baseline Damage Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
14 State Game G(1,1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
15 Reduced State Game G(1,1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
16 State Game G(4,5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
17 Reduced State Game G(4,5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
18 Conditional Player Win Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
19 Summary of Most Likely Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
20 Initial Stationary Probabilities vs Sub-optimal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
21 Initial Stationary Probabilities vs Blue Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
22 Damage Cost of Most Likely Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
x
Table Page
23 IP Optimal Solution Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
24 IP Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
25 Initial Stationary Probabilities vs Allocation Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
26 Summary of Allocation Most Likely Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
27 Damage Cost of Allocation Most Likely Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
xi
A STOCHASTIC GAME THEORETICAL MODEL FOR CYBER SECURITY
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
The difficulty in assessing cyber defense and resiliency is high due to the intangi-
ble nature of cyberspace and is compounded by the rapid development of technology.
Cyber hardening, defined by the construction of network infrastructure to bolster se-
curity via system redundancy, detection and prevention technologies, and acceptable
use policies [2], have been researched extensively with direct real-world applications
and results. However cyber resiliency, or the ability of a system to deter, withstand,
and recover from harmful events [2, 3], remains predominately theoretical. This does
not mean that researchers are not striving to obtain actionable methods to quantify
and define the resiliency of a cyber system. On the contrary, researchers have been
investigating the problem for decades. However, with each method proposed, adver-
saries continue to develop unique strategies and methodologies that negate preemptive
measures [4].
Cyber warfare has gained increased awareness over the last two decades due to
hostile actions taken by nation states. What seemed liked science fiction has become
a frightful reality, as seen in 2009 when adversaries launched a virus called Stuxnet,
gaining access to an Iranian nuclear weapons program and enabling remote access
to centrifuges that enabled the processing and enrichment of nuclear materials [5, 6].
These adversaries accomplished kinetic effects via cyberspace by adjusting settings
on the centrifuges, causing them to spin beyond the functional threshold and subse-
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quently destroying them [6]. This attack halted production for a year and remains
unattributed to this day [5]. Stuxnet shocked cyber security analysts into reevaluat-
ing the security and resiliency of their cyber systems resulting in a shift in focus to
cyber resiliency research.
The realization that actions in cyberspace have the potential to create kinetic
effects reemphasizes the importance of cyber security. Game theory provides a po-
tential solution for cyber security issues and allows researchers to evaluate the actions
between attackers and defenders in cyberspace by assessing the strategies and payoffs
for each side. Current methods in applying game theory for cyber defense analysis
frequently assume perfect information, in that both the attacker and the defender
have complete knowledge of the strategies and capabilities of the opposing player.
This approach simplifies the problem and allows for a more tractable solution, yet
creates a barrier in application to real-world scenarios. While each side may know
their respective capabilities, intent, and strategies, there is a degree of uncertainty
as to the same qualities of the opposition. Furthermore, since cyber actions progress
rapidly and are difficult to detect and analyze in real-time, the degree of uncertainty
increases, making an imperfect game more desirable in practice.
This research develops the use of game theoretical models in order to provide
the optimal defensive response to adversarial threats in the cyber domain and to
provide insights into resource allocation when improving cyber resilience. This study
will cover various games with utilities that include a degree of uncertainty in the
opponent’s strategy. By accounting for uncertainty, additional fidelity is gained in
player outcomes and provides results that better emulate reality.
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1.2 Problem Statement
Develop a game theoretical model in which cyber defense resiliency can be quan-
tified from the perspective of the cyber system defender. Develop action and state
spaces for an attacker-defender scenario to provide a realistic evaluation of cyber
resiliency.
1.3 Research Objectives
This research seeks to answer the following questions to quantify cyber defense
resiliency and validate proposed models.
Question 1.
How can the resiliency of a cyber system be evaluated using game theoretical and
stochastic modeling?
Question 2.
Given the current state of a cyber system and potential actions of a malicious
actor, how may cyber security analysts evaluate the likelihood of success or failure of
defensive cyber actions?
Question 3.
In what manner can a cost analysis be performed on an upgrade or replacement
of cyber defense hardware and software while in turn evaluating the effects on the
system?
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1.4 Assumptions
First, the game theoretical model is set as a two-player non-cooperative game such
that players are defined as the “Blue” force and “Red” force, indicating the defender
and attacker, respectively. While each of these forces may realistically consist of
multiple entities performing various simultaneous actions, the sequential actions of an
attacker-defender scenario are best captured when each force is treated as a singular
entity.
Second, retaliatory actions by the defender are not considered as these actions
counter the objective of evaluating cyber defense resiliency. Additionally, attribution
is difficult to obtain in cyberspace, making retaliation by a defensive force difficult
and worthy of its own research.
Finally, data from cyber systems are not readily available due to system complex-
ity, security risks, or a lack of understanding of what constitutes applicable data. As
such, all values used in the game models are nominal. The focus of the research is on
the methodology with the numerical evaluation supporting the methods used. There-
fore, the subjectivity of the values do not pose a risk to the validity of the proposed
models.
Additional assumptions are inherently necessary in specific types of game theoreti-
cal models and will be addressed accordingly as they are presented in the development
of the research methodology.
1.5 Overview
This thesis consists of six chapters, to include this introductory chapter, Chapter
I. Chapter II provides a literature review consisting of a brief history of cyber war-
fare and current research conducted utilizing game theory to evaluate cyber security.
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Chapter III introduces various concepts in game theory as well as examples of how
each concept can be leveraged in analyzing various scenarios common to cyber de-
fense. Chapter IV discusses the methodology used in formulating the proposed game
theoretical model. Chapter V provides an analysis of results from the model using
synthetically-generated data, followed by conclusions and further research in Chapter
VI.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to define and provide the current issues surrounding
resiliency as it pertains to cyberspace. This chapter consists of four sections, each
discussing the history, necessary terminology, and proposed game theoretical models
for interactions between an attacker and defender in cyberspace. Section 2.2 provides
a brief history of cyber warfare. Section 2.3 defines and differentiates between cy-
ber resiliency and cyber hardening. Section 2.4 provides an overview of the current
challenges of cyber defense. Section 2.5 discusses the current game theoretical models
proposed and utilized in providing a response to the attacker-defender scenario within
the cyber domain, as well as a brief overview of game theory and its key concepts.
Finally, Section 2.6 provides an overview of stochastic modeling by means of discrete
time Markov chains.
2.2 History of Cyber Warfare
Cyber warfare has gained significant importance over the past decade as incidents
increase in both frequency and severity, and new technology develops. With growing
interest in computer science and related fields, research and development in both cy-
berspace and cyber warfare has progressed rapidly. The development and progression
of cyber warfare can be categorized in four distinct phases, or insights, as defined by
Warner: “Computers can spill sensitive data and must be guarded (1960s)... Com-
puters can be attacked and data stolen (1970s)... We can build computer attacks
into military arsenals (1980s and 1990s)... Others might do that to us - and perhaps
already are (1990s)” [7]. These insights form the basis for the overview to follow.
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The term “cyberspace” was first used in 1984 in the science fiction novel Neu-
romancer by William Gibson and became common terminology in the early 1990s,
originally viewed as a component of information warfare [8, 9], or “operations carried
out to defend our own information and our own information systems, or to attack
and affect the information and information systems of an enemy” [10]. Cyberspace
is defined as “an operational domain framed by the use of electronics and the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum to create, store, modify, exchange, and exploit information via
interconnected and Internetted information systems and their associated infrastruc-
tures” [11]. It is currently viewed as its own warfare domain while remaining closely
tied to information operations. Associated with cyberspace is cyberpower, defined
as “the ability to use cyberspace to strategic advantage and to influence events in
the other operational environments and across the instruments of power” [11]. Cy-
berpower is used to express the dominance of an organization or nation state in
cyberspace. It is frequently used in the context of a quantitative measure, yet is sub-
jective due to the difficulty in accurately determining a quantitative or qualitative
value in which to make comparisons.
During the 1960s, computer espionage became a concern for the first time as mali-
cious users took advantage of the open access to computer data. Users were beginning
to explore the nuances of computers and the potential added utility provided in day-
to-day operations. Data could be stored and shared in a digital format for the first
time allowing for greater access to all users. However, it quickly became apparent that
with greater access comes an increased potential for data to be stolen or manipulated
for malicious purposes. These criminal actions spurred the first implementation of
administrator privileges, password hashing, data encryption, and file permissions in
the early 1970s [7].
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The first large-scale cyber related attack occurred in 1988. Named the “Morris
Worm,” the attack leveraged network resources to the point of causing shutdowns
of portions of the Advance Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), the
precursor to the Internet. This development was the first major cause of public
concern in cyberspace and fueled the creation of the Computer Emergency Response
Team (CERT), a team constructed to focus solely on the computer security for the
United States [12].
In the mid 1990s, Russia and China began recognizing the United States’ focus and
dominance in the cyber domain, as well as the reliance on the U.S. in obtaining their
own hardware. As such, both countries began focusing on their own development of
computer systems, specifically within their respective military, fearing that the U.S.
may embed viruses in the computer systems that could be triggered at a later date
rendering their systems useless [7].
As computer development and interest began to grown internationally, the U.S.
government grew concerned with their own network infrastructure limitations. In
1995, the RAND Corporation led exercises to determine how well US systems and
defensive cyber teams can respond to a cyber conflict. The results were disastrous
and shocking to those acting as the defensive team. The U.S. infrastructure was
shown to be less stable than previously thought and critical infrastructure could be
thoroughly degraded or destroyed solely by cyber attacks [7].
Similarly, the 1997 exercise ELIGIBLE RECEIVER was executed by direction
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Participants were divided into a “blue team” (friendly
actors) and “red team”(hostile actors), where the red team “was restricted to using
store-bought computers and hacking tools downloaded from the Internet” [7]. The
goal of the exercise was to test how well the Department of Defense (DoD) operated
with partner government branches in the midst of an active cyber event. The results
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were similar to those in the RAND exercise. While the red team was not permitted
to create actual effects, they could clearly prove that they had the capability to cause
severe harm to the nation’s critical infrastructure [7].
Coinciding with the growing local and international concerns in limitations of
cyber security practices, active cyber attacks began to appear on a regular basis
in the 1990s with hobbyists and script kiddies (amateur hackers who use existing
scripts and codes for their own purposes), organized crime, and nation state driven
reconnaissance via the Internet. Typical attacks came in the form of spyware, rootkits,
bots, spam, phishing, credit card fraud, identity theft, corporate information theft,
and denial of service (DoS) [11].
These techniques have not lost prevalence in the following years, but have instead
gained greater severity with increased computing power and the integration of large-
scale systems. By the 2000s, hostile users began to target large corporations, perform
massive scale credit fraud, and implement DoS by utilizing large botnets in order to
damage nation state infrastructure [11]. Additionally, NATO executed the first public
use of militarized cyber warfare against Yugoslavia with the use of website defacement,
the spread of propaganda via media outlets, and distributed DoS (DDoS) [12].
The major impetus for enhanced cyber security practices and awareness occurred
in 2010 with the release of the Stuxnet worm. Stuxnet was released on an Iranian
nuclear facility in order to damage centrifuges by attacking “Siemens’ Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that are used to control and monitor
industrial processes” [12]. While this attack was never been attributed to a source,
it was believed that the instigator may have been one or more nation states with
a vested interest in seeing the nuclear program disrupted or destroyed. This attack
fueled worldwide awareness to the criticality of cyber security research on information
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systems and the potential destruction that can be left in the wake of successful actions
in the cyber domain [12].
2.3 Cyber Resiliency and Hardening
As defined by Wilner, resilience, and cyber resilience by extension, “is the ability
to bounce back, to mitigate the effects of an attack, or recover quickly after getting
hit” [3]. He further states that resilience is linked with deterrence in that if the
actions taken by an attacker have little to no effect on a resilient system, the attacker
is less likely to begin or continue to press the attack. Thus, the attacker or would-be
attacker is deterred from progressing further [3].
Leveraging a number of characteristics of resilience, Haimes provides a similar
definition that encapsulates all of them: “Resilience... is defined as the ability of the
system to withstand a major disruption within acceptable degradation parameters
and to recover within an acceptable time and composite costs and risks” [2]. Both
authors provide definitions with varying degrees of specificity but the underlying
concept holds true for both: resilience is the ability of a system to resist or recover
from a harmful event originating from an internal or external source.
Cyber hardening refers to building network infrastructure that bolsters security
“by building fences or formulating policies and procedures that would limit access
to infrastructures” [2]. This is typically done by the implementation of firewalls,
intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems, and a set of rules or policies
to limit vulnerabilities and traffic flow to what is deemed acceptable and trustworthy.
Haimes further notes that hardening provides little to no assistance in minimizing
the recovery time after an event and any associated costs and risks [2].
While resiliency and hardening are related, improving one does not necessarily im-
prove the other. From these definitions, hardening can be viewed as a sub-component
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that bolsters resiliency, but not the converse. Thus, in the search for methods to im-
prove resiliency, hardening techniques remain in consideration.
There are points of overlap between resiliency and hardening in the redundancy
and robustness of the system. Redundancy is the use of additional components or
systems with the goal of supplementing the primary component or system in the
event that it fails [2]. From a hardening perspective, redundancy bolsters security by
providing the option to isolate a failed or attacked system without adversely affecting
system availability and performance for users. This same reasoning is used for im-
proving resiliency since negative effects on the system can be minimized or negated.
Haimes defines robustness as “the degree of insensitivity of a system to perturbations
or to errors in the estimates of those parameters affecting the design choice” [2]. Ro-
bustness, then, hardens a system by providing a configuration in which maximizes
the availability of network resources while making the system resilient by ensuring
the system remains unaffected by internal and external disturbances, be it malicious
or otherwise.
2.4 Challenges in Cyber Defense
The challenges faced in performing and evaluating cyber defense are vast. In
preventing adversary actions, defenders must be able to anticipate and have complete
knowledge of every flaw in their hardware and software. However, such breadth and
depth of knowledge is simply infeasible as new developments are made at a rapid pace.
As network architecture and associated capabilities increase in complexity, so do the
associated risks [13]. The following three sections provide a brief overview of current
common issues in cyber defense research: vulnerability management, attribution, and
metrics.
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Network Assessment.
A key component in determining the quality of security on any network is the
frequency and accuracy of network assessments. These come in many forms and are
dependent on the criteria used to measure the assessment. One fundamental form of
assessment is a vulnerability rating based on the number of devices on the network
that do not have the most current patches or contain known vulnerabilities. Scanners
are used to make a vulnerability determination and are updated upon release of
new patches and vulnerability signatures. Scans provide a good indication of how
vulnerable a system may be, however they lack the ability to show how the network
can resist or respond should a vulnerability be exploited.
This last assessment is difficult to determine due to the ambiguity in what defines
a resilient system. An attempt is made for military networks by focusing on the
stability of the network infrastructure in the event of an attack. On the surface
this may seem to be an adequate approach, however it does not necessarily capture
the information component of network resiliency. The military often attributes cyber
attacks to some degree of destruction of the infrastructure devices without considering
the information that may be lost or stolen from those same devices. As such, current
practices tend to provide a “subjective and unreliable assessment of impact” [14].
Vulnerability Management.
Network administrators frequently experience complications in cyber security due
to regular patch cycles. A patch refers to settings and updates that eliminate discov-
ered vulnerabilities in an operating system or software. These patches are released
in cycles originating from the developer on a monthly or bi-weekly basis and are
frequently publicly announced. Awareness of known vulnerabilities is critical for
administrators, however this awareness is also provided to potential attackers. As
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patches are announced, attackers gain new paths and methods to exploit a system
until administrators can take appropriate security actions.
Compounding this issue, patches are released and announced regularly on what
is known as “Patch Tuesday,” followed the next day by “Exploit Wednesday.” The
danger of regular patch cycles is noted by Jajodia: “The dynamics of this process
significantly favors the attacker over the defender because the attacker needs to find
only a single exploitable bug while the defender must ensure none exist” [15].
Additionally, patch management is highly dependent on the Internet for distri-
bution to clients. While some vendors have distribution solutions in the event the
Internet becomes unavailable, many vendors do not. Patches can have inherent latent
issues that may not become apparent until deployed to the system. It is gradually
becoming a common practice to include the criticality of each patch in releases, how-
ever it has yet to reach across all vendors. When vendors neglect to provide this
information, users become hesitant to apply the patches, thereby making the network
more vulnerable to attack [11].
Vulnerabilities are not strictly limited to the system and software. Human error
creates additional vulnerabilities in maintaining a good cyber defense posture. In-
filtration of networks is often due to a failure of a user or system administrator to
adhere to proper cyber security practices. These mistakes include accidentally releas-
ing a password to an outside source, failing to properly test a patch before applying
it to the system, and the absence or unsatisfactory maintenance of network security
policies [11].
Finally, issues arise from the increased dependence on the interconnectivity of sys-
tems. This is most prevalent in cyber-physical systems where high-value devices are
connected via a computer network to regulate and control each phase of the system’s
processes. Administrators favor these systems because they allow greater control
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and quicker response times, critical in the oversight of industrial control systems.
However, the trade-off is greater exposure to deception and infiltration attacks since
“network connections across critical infrastructures create the potential for intrusions
and cascading failures that can greatly magnify the impact of a small attack” [5].
The appeal for interconnectivity also comes from a false belief that if more money
is spent on infrastructure and software, cyber security posturing will improve. Pfleeger
notes that “investigations by other researchers indicate that some security investments
can actually decrease security simply because fixing one vulnerability sometimes en-
ables another one” [16]. Therefore, the pace of acquisitions need to coincide with the
proper implementation and evaluation of each device so that the number of additional
vulnerabilities introduced to the system is minimized.
With awareness and careful execution, the majority of the aforementioned vulner-
abilities can be successfully overcome. Unfortunately, even if users and administrators
adhere to optimal security practices, it is impossible to account for all vulnerabilities.
As an example, Wilner notes that “backdoor portals and zero-day software vulnerabil-
ities seemingly pile up. Even air-gapping secure networks from unsecured networks
- which can involve physically separating internal digital space from online digital
space - is not foolproof” [3]. Regardless, reducing the attack surface by accounting
for these flaws can still thwart a great deal of the most compromising and destructive
attacks.
Attribution.
Defense becomes simplified if one knows who the adversary is and what actions
they can take. In the physical space, one does not antagonize an opponent unless
they can reasonably conclude that the opponent can be, at a minimum, matched
in resources, technology, strategy, or sheer destructive power. Likewise, one can
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predict to a degree of accuracy the chances of success in defending an attack given
observations made of the opponent. Cyberspace introduces a layer of complexity
where actions can be taken without being cognizant of the physical location of the
source and the person or entity behind the action. Wilner highlights this fact by
stating “the problem of attribution - who to blame for an attack and who to retaliate
against as a result - is a knotty problem in digital space” [3]. Resources that may
not necessarily be owned by the actor can be leveraged to further obscure the source.
Cyberspace, then, “provides traditionally weaker states, non-state actors, collectives,
and individuals disproportionate power over traditionally powerful states” [3].
Furthermore, the interconnectivity of devices via the Internet has increased the
ease in which attackers can obfuscate their identity and location. Many attacks, such
as DoS and DDoS, utilize the victim’s network or an external network to launch
an attack so that the attacker may keep their own identification information hidden
behind layers of devices and Internet protocols (IPs) [11]. As a result, the victim is
incapable of attributing the attack to a single source resulting in misguided root-cause
analysis.
Frequently, attacks that seem as though they may not be malicious are falsely
attributed to a failure with the system or the network. Pfleeger notes “an incident’s
cause isn’t always clear - for instance, sluggish network behavior can be the result of
a virus, a denial-of-service attack, or simply an unusual but benign spike in network
activity” [16]. This oftentimes enables advanced-persistent threats, attacks that occur
over an extended length of time, to thrive undetected for months or years [3].
Metrics.
A source of contention in metric standardization is that metrics are dependent
on the research being performed and what cyber phenomena is to be captured from
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said research. For example, when evaluating intrusion detection one may consider
bandwidth a critical metric since attacks across a network may cause packet drops
and a degradation of user connectivity. However, attacks exist in which bandwidth
remains unaffected or contains negligible changes such that it appears as typical
daily network traffic. In this case, bandwidth may not be a critical metric or may
only be considered alongside sensor data from an intrusion detection system (IDS)
or firewall. One may continue to add elements into the evaluation, however without
standardization it may not be clear when sufficient data has be obtained and the
value of each metric in the overall evaluation.
Capturing data introduces a new layer of difficulty. The integrity and validity of
the data must first be considered. Once the data is deemed valid and free of data
corruption, then the required amount of data and its source, that is from a test envi-
ronment or live system, must next be considered. Furthermore, should data be taken
from a test environment, a determination must be made on how closely the environ-
ment resembles the real-world system. Because of the unique requirements imposed
on a live system, it may not be possible to construct a similar test environment to
the degree that is required.
These are only a few of the decisions to be made for appropriate metrics, however
“no proposed set of metrics is universally accepted or embraced as useful, and no
framework lets organizations answer their wide variety of questions about network
and information security” [16]. To correct the lack of agreement, Pfleeger argues that
“we must address two problems: selecting attributes that reflect the cybersecurity
aspects of interest and finding appropriate ways to combine these attributes so that we
can measure overall cybersecurity” [16]. These two problems are certainly nontrivial
due to the adaptive nature of attackers and the cyber domain, statistical analysis
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is very difficult. Additionally, not every parameter can be captured since there are
far too many [17].
Kramer et al. [11] propose that a basis for measurement in performance is “con-
nectivity, availability, and bandwidth”. This provides a solid foundation, however
“measurements are often made infrequently, inconsistently, and incompletely, frus-
trating those who want to use the results” [16]. Without the availability of data, the
measurement debate may remain unresolved.
Once standardized metrics are agreed upon, the next logical step is to relate mod-
els constructed within a test environment to real-world systems. Gaining metrics from
attack testing is difficult since attackers frequently modify their attacks to increase
severity and effectiveness [18]. The number of potential modifications are vast and
dependent on the systems utilized by both the attacker and the defender, making
enumeration and testing a seemingly intangible objective. Additionally, hackers and
penetration testers develop new techniques regularly to infiltrate and exploit systems,
making it near impossible to project the possible actions taken by an attacker. This
uncertainty “is the unique and perhaps the biggest uncertainty in real-time security
analysis” [17]. However, malicious actors are also subject to a degree of uncertainty
as even the most skilled attacker encounters unforeseen problems causing a failure in
their action. As Xie et al. [17] note, “Cyber attacks are not always guaranteed to
succeed, thus there is the uncertainty from the imperfect nature of exploits”.
2.5 Game Theory in Cyber Defense
Game theory provides a mathematical model of the interactions between players
and has gained increased prevalence due to its logical applicability to a vast range
of topics, to include economics, computer science, biology, and politically, as well as
gaining additional traction in cyber security research [19, 20]. In its fundamental
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form, game theoretical models define a set number of participants, called players,
who are each defined by a set of actions and strategies. These actions and subsequent
strategies make the critical assumption that players act rationally, that is “a perfectly
rational player could justifiably play [a strategy] against one or more perfectly rational
opponents” [21]. Games may be constructed as cooperative, or coalitional games,
where players work together to maximize the utility for all players, or non-cooperative
games where each player seeks to maximize their own utility.
Additionally, each player is assigned a utility, or payoff, based on the action or
strategy played. These utilities can take many forms depending on the context of
the game, be it monetary, probabilistic, or synthetically generated values, for exam-
ple. The action space and utilities for each player can be affected depending on the
knowledge each player has of the opponent’s action. Perfect information occurs when
each player has knowledge of every decision made by all other players, as opposed to
imperfect information where some or all of the decisions made by the other players
is unknown. This is not to be confused with complete and incomplete information.
Complete information occurs when each player knows the number of players in the
game, their respective strategies, and the utility functions for each player, whereas
incomplete information occurs when there is uncertainty about any or all of this
information [1, 4].
Games can be expressed in normal form or extensive form. Normal form games
restrict each player to act simultaneously and are expressed in the form of a matrix.
Extensive form games add a temporal aspect to the game over potentially several
turns vice requiring simultaneous player actions over a single turn as found in normal
form games. Actions are taken by players sequentially over either an infinite amount
of time or until a terminal point is reached. Each player’s action space is determined
by what is feasible and rational for that player based on the action of the previous
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player and the completeness of knowledge of that action. Extensive form games can
be represented in tree form, as found in sequential games, but can also be shown in
normal form where each column or row indicates the strategy, or set of actions, taken
by the respective player.
To fully understand these concepts, it is typical to examine the “Prison’s Dilemma”
game. This game is a normal form non-cooperative game consisting of two players,
A and B, both of whom are suspects of a crime. Both suspects are being detained by
the police and questioned separately in order to determine who is guilty of the crime.
Each of the suspects can take one of two actions, defect by accusing the other of the
crime or cooperate by saying nothing. The actions taken by each player determines
the number of years each will spend in prison. If A and B both defect, they will both
serve a sentence of three years, whereas if they both cooperate they will both serve
a sentence of one year. Additionally, if A defects and B cooperates, A will not serve
any time in prison while B will be sentenced to five years. The same applies for the
converse situation with the payoffs applied similarly. Since each suspect desires the
shortest sentence possible, each utility is expressed as a negative value. For example,
a sentence of one year is expressed as -1 [1].
The normal form matrix is shown in Table 1. The utilities are read as pairs where
the first value corresponds to A and the second with B.
B
Defect Cooperate
A
Defect −3,−3 0,−5
Cooperate −5, 0 −1,−1
Table 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma Normal Form Matrix [1]
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To find the solution to this game, the best payoff for each player must be found
such that neither player can do any better by deviating from their strategy. This
means that given one player chooses to play a specific strategy, the other player
chooses the best response to that strategy such that their utility is at least as good
as all other responses. Thus, the best response need not be unique. The strategy
played is known as the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium may not necessarily
be unique either and may not exist. However, in a mixed strategy game where
each player’s strategies are played probabilistically, at least one Nash equilibrium will
always exist. Therefore, if a Nash equilibrium does not exist in the normal form game,
one may turn to a mixed strategy game in order to find an equilibrium.
Returning to the Prisoner’s Dilemma and first considering A’s best response to B,
it is shown that B receives the best payoff when choosing to defect with a sentence of
zero years. Given this strategy by B, A’s best response is to defect as well since the
sentence of three years is shorter than the sentence of five years if A cooperates. Using
the same logic to find B’s best response to A, it is found that A will defect. Therefore,
a unique Nash equilibrium is found with both suspects defecting and each receiving
a sentence of three years. While this may be a surprising result since each suspect
can receive a better payoff by cooperating, neither suspect can reasonably expect the
other to choose to cooperate since the best payoff comes from defecting, regardless of
whether or not the suspects are allowed to discuss before being questioned.
Extensive research currently exists in the application of game theory for cyber
security, however it is predominantly theoretical with few exemplars given. The
primary game theoretical models used in research today for cyber security are those
of the extensive form, stochastic, and Bayesian games.
Yuan et al. [22] present a two-level Stackelberg game in order to evaluate the
actions taken by a resilient control system as part of a cyber-physical system in the
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event of a denial of service or distributed denial of service attack. Each level represents
the layer of the cyber-physical system in which each Stackelberg game is being played.
The first, or internal, level takes place at the cyber layer where the players are the
intrusion detection system (IDS) and the cyber attacker. The second, or external,
level occurs at the physical layer between the external disturbance on the system and
the controller [22].
The Stackelberg game is played where one player acts as the leader and the other
the follower. The leader is a dominant position as it can enforce strategies on the
follower, giving the leader a first-mover advantage. In this instance, the leader and
follower are defined as they are previously listed in their respective level. The cost
functions for each level are represented with respect to the leader, where the first
level seeks to minimize the cost of a false alarm for the IDS and the second seeks to
maximize the amount of disturbance caused by the attacker.
In their analysis, Yuan et al. [22] found that a unique Stackelberg equilibrium
can be found from their theoretical two-level model. Their work has been applied to
a power grid system furthering the efficacy of their proposed model [22].
Stochastic games build on a normal form game by including a state space in
which the game will move between states given a specific transition probability and
the actions taken by each player. The payoff for each player is based on what state
the game is in at the termination point [21].
In their paper on attacker strategies and finding the optimal defensive response
strategy, Jiang et al. [23] propose a two-player, zero-sum stochastic game where
the players are defined as the attacker and defender. The state space is defined by
the level of system privileges the attacker has obtained at any given point in the
game with transitions occurring based on the action taken by the attacker. Since the
attacker is continuously gaining privileges from the defender’s system, the utilities for
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each player are additive inverses based on the amount of cost to the defender that
considers operational costs, cost of damage, any residual costs, and the cost effect on
the system based on the defender’s action [23].
The authors conclude that their theoretical approach can successfully predict the
attacker’s strategy and apply an optimal defensive response strategy. Additionally,
they acknowledge that there are limitations in their model. They first note the
difficulty in evaluating all the attack strategies that will allow the attacker to escalate
privileges. Second, the authors note that in order to test their model, they were
required to manually provide values for all parameters considered [23]. This echoes a
common issue in analysis of cyber defense where good usable data is severely lacking.
A variation on the stochastic game, the Bayesian game, is used by Ouyang et al.
[24] in order to evaluate a scenario in which there is asymmetric information amongst
players and strategies are updated as the state of the system changes. Games with
asymmetric information are those in which “agents have different information over
time” [24]. The authors introduce the concept of a common information based perfect
Bayesian equilibria which “consists of a pair of strategy profile and a belief system
that are sequentially rational and consistent” [24]. They further highlight the fact
that typically a Nash equilibrium in these types of games would be one which does
not account for deviations in the stage-to-stage progression, only deviations made by
the players at the outset of the game. Thus, they require that any equilibria found
for this game must be those such that players can make no better deviation at any
stage of the game, not just the start.
Ouyang et al. [24] show that their model provides an equilibrium for a specified
subset of dynamic games. In their research they define the existence of common
information based perfect Bayesian equilibria and provide a solution method by
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backward-induction. Finally, they utilize their method in a small example to show
the calculations of each stage of the game and its progression.
Kovach et al. [25] discuss the use of hypergame theory in various applications
and note that there is currently limited research using this technique for cyber de-
fense strategies. Hypergame theory is an extension of game theory that includes the
value of the beliefs and perceptions of each player into the formulation of the model.
While no specific model is proposed, it is noted that this approach allows for the
inclusion of deception based attacks, which are often a concern when evaluating the
trustworthiness and reliability of outputs from a cyber-physical system. Additionally,
hypergame theory enables researchers to take into consideration the rationality and
intent behind an adversary’s actions, for which neither game theory nor decision the-
ory take into account [25]. Utilizing hypergame theory may help improve evaluations
of attacker-defender scenarios as researchers discover more information as to what
drives attackers to act in a hostile manner and how a defender should respond. The
matter of intent is quickly increasing in relevance since, as Connell notes, “adversaries
- whether state or non-state actors - are likely to view interactions in cyberspace very
differently than we do” [26].
2.6 Discrete-Time Markov Chains
This section provides an overview of key concepts for discrete-time Markov chains
using concepts and notation as presented in [27] and [28].
A stochastic process is defined by X = {X(t), t ∈ T}, where X(t) is a random
variable that represents the state of the stochastic process over a defined time t. These
states X(t) can represent a number of things from weather status and countries in
conflict at time t, to the number of customers processed by tellers at a bank at time
t. If T is countable, the stochastic process is called a discrete-time stochastic process.
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Otherwise, the process is a continuous-time stochastic process. The state space is then
defined as the collection of possible states represented by X(t) [27, 28]. Since this
research considers only discrete-time stochastic processes, continuous-time stochastic
processes will not be discussed further.
For a stochastic process X = {Xn, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .} and finite n, when Xn = i the
stochastic process is defined to be in state i at time n. Let Pij be the probability of
moving, or transitioning, from state i to state j and
P{Xn+1 = j|Xn = i,Xn−1 = in−1, . . . , X1 = i1, X0 = i0} = Pij (1)
for states i0, i1, . . ., in−1, i, and j and n ≥ 0 [27]. Thus, “any future state Xn+1,
given the past states X0, X1, . . ., Xn−1 and the present state Xn, is independent of
the past states and depends only on the present state” [27]. This stochastic process
defines a Markov chain. If n is finite, the chain is said to be a discrete-time Markov
chain. Furthermore, the probabilities of transitioning from state i to state j can be
represented as a transition matrix P for all i, j ≥ 0 [27, 28].
P =

P00 P01 P02 · · ·
P10 P11 P12 · · ·
...
...
...
...
Pi0 Pi1 Pi2 · · ·
...
...
...
...

(2)
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Since P is consists of probabilities, the following must hold true:
Pij ≥ 0, i, j ≥ 0
∞∑
j=0
Pij = 1, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . (3)
Additionally, if Pii = 1 for state i, the state i is an absorbing state since once the
state is entered, it is never left again. Thus by Equation 3, for absorbing state i and
state j 6= i, Pij = 0.
A Markov chain may be represented by a set of classes consisting of states that
communicate with one another. If two states i and j communicate, then Pij > 0
and Pji > 0. If only one class exists for a Markov chain, that is all states in the
chain communicate, it is said to be irreducible [28]. Chains can be further described
as periodic with period d “if P nii = 0 whenever n is not divisible by d and d is the
greatest integer with this property” [27]. Otherwise, if a chain is both irreducible and
not periodic, that is a state has a period of 1, it is said to be aperiodic [27, 28].
States are further classified into being either transient or recurrent. As defined
by Ross [28], “For any state i we let fi denote the probability that, starting in state
i, the process will ever reenter state i. State i is said to be recurrent if fi = 1 and
transient if fi < 1.” In other words, a state is considered recurrent if it is guaranteed
that the chain will return to the state, and transient if there is a probability that a
state will be left without being reentered again. Note that all absorbing states are
recurrent, but the converse is false.
Recurrent states are further defined by the expected number of transitions made
before returning to a state by being positive recurrent or null recurrent. Letting mj
be the expected number of transitions before returning to state j, Ross [28] defines
each as “the recurrent state j is positive recurrent if mj < ∞ and say that it is null
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recurrent if mj =∞.” Using these and previous definitions, an ergodic Markov chain
is defined as one that is positive recurrent, irreducible, and aperiodic [27].
These state classifications give way to finding the long-run proportions for states
in a Markov chain, or the proportion of transitions occurring between states. Letting
πj be the long-run proportion for state j and πi be the long-run proportion of state
i, each πj is found by solving the following system of linear equations [28]:
πj =
∑
i
πiPij j ≥ 1
∑
j
πj = 1 (4)
The first equation shows the long-run proportion of state j given an initial, or starting,
state i and the respective transition probability. Since each πj is a proportion, the
second equation must hold true for all states j. Furthermore, if a Markov chain is
ergodic, then a unique limiting distribution is found by
πj = lim
n→∞
P nij = 0, if state j is transient or null recurrent
πj = lim
n→∞
P nij > 0, if state j positive recurrent (5)
and equals the long-run proportion for state j [27, 28]. This distribution is also said
to be stationary, defined by [27]
Pj =
∞∑
i=0
PiPij, j ≥ 0 (6)
Letting T = {1, 2, . . . , t} be the set of transient states, a matrix can be formed showing
the transition probabilities between each of the transient states. Since, the matrix
contains only transient states, the sum of each row may no longer be equal to one.
Thus, the transient state matrix is represented by [27]
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Q =

P11 P12 P13 · · · P1t
p21 P22 P23 · · · P2t
...
...
...
. . .
...
Pi1 Pi2 Pi3 · · · Pit
...
...
...
. . .
...
Pt1 Pt2 Pt3 · · · Ptt

(7)
Leveraging the transient state matrix and mij as defined earlier, the matrix of the
expected number of time periods in state j given it is entered from state i is
M =

m11 m12 m13 · · · m1t
m21 m22 m23 · · · m2t
...
...
...
. . .
...
mi1 mi2 mi3 · · · mit
...
...
...
. . .
...
mt1 mt2 mt3 · · · mtt

(8)
and represented with the equation M = I+QM, where I is an identity matrix of size
t ∈ T . Using linear algebra, this equation is equivalent to M =
(
I−Q
)−1
, providing
values for each mij ∈ M. From M and letting fij be the probability that state i
ever transitions to state j, mij is represented in terms of fij by conditioning on the
probability of the chain ever entering j given it starts in i, shown by [27]
mij = E[number of transitions into state j|start in i]
= mjjfij (9)
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Therefore, the probability of ever entering state j given that the chain starts in
state i is fij =
mij
mjj
[27].
2.7 Summary
Cyber defense and resiliency is far from a trivial problem. In its relatively short
history, there have been vast technological improvements in cyberspace allowing for
greater usability and integration with the added trade-off of risk due to malicious
actors and behavior. Researchers continue to develop techniques to thwart attackers
and minimize risk to critical systems, but the ever changing cyber environment and
lack of available data continue to make research difficult to implement in real-world
systems. However, the use of game theory provides the potential for gaining great
insight into the future solutions to cyber defense and continues to gain traction.
While there have been a number of successes in proposed game theoretical models
for cyber defense, these models are largely theoretical. A repeating theme in cyber
defense research is the struggle to capture adequate data, thus many researchers
must resort to manually generated data to show the validity of their proposed model.
Additionally, current research tends to focus on a specific attack type or sequence vice
generalizing for any attacker-defender scenario and defender network architecture.
This provides sufficient results for the specified attack method but loses scalability
and, potentially, relevance as attackers develop new strategies and methodology.
An additional shortcoming in much of the cyber defense research is a common
underlying assumption of perfect information. This is a safe approach and allows for
more feasibility in finding an appropriate model, however does not treat itself well to
real world scenarios. As recent attacks have shown, it is not a trivial matter for a
defender to detect and identify an attacker. Because of the signature based operation
of defensive hardware like IDSs and firewalls, an attacker can bypass these devices if
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they can avoid using an attack strategy that resembles any of the known signatures.
If an attacker is successful, the odds of detecting the infiltration and exploitation
become increasingly worse for the defender. Therefore, cyber defense lends itself
more appropriately to the use of imperfect and, possibly, incomplete information.
However, while more appropriate, this only increases the difficulty in modeling an
attacker-defender scenario. If realistic data were to become available showing effects
from actions taken by both the attacker and defender, game theoretic modeling can
increase the fidelity of capturing the real world interactions.
Current research tends to focus efforts on models in which a single technique
is used. In turn, these methods often lack breadth and depth of analysis of the
overall cyber security assessment. This research departs from this commonality by
encompassing multiple techniques to gain greater fidelity in the current resilience of
a cyber network and the recommended steps for improvement.
Additionally, this research uses notional data as previous researchers have done
due to the lack of real-world data availability. While imperfect information is not
directly addressed, uncertainty is introduced via the use of stochastic modeling. The
start of the proposed model makes assumptions on the starting state of the system,
introducing elements of imperfect information, but has the potential to become more
refined by eliminating degrees of uncertainty as information is gained during the game
progression. Furthermore, the model resembles imperfect information by considering
all possible actions and system states for the defender and attacker. Finally, should
real-world data become available, the proposed model can quickly provide real-time
assessments on the game based on the current state of the system.
29
III. Applications in Cyber Security
3.1 Overview
This chapter provides examples of foundational game types within the context of
cyber related scenarios as well as their solution methods. The game types and solution
methods herein form a basis for solving the model outlined in this research. First,
normal form games are addressed in both the general sum and zero-sum forms with
pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Next, the normal form games are revisited to show
how mixed-strategy Nash equilibria are found so each player can play randomized
strategies. This is followed by a minmax game where one player wishes to find a
strategy that results in the smallest maximum expected utility for the opponent.
Finally, the extensive form game provides a scenario in which the interactions between
players may be viewed in an explicit temporal structure as opposed the simultaneous
actions of players found in normal form games [21]. All scenarios and data points are
notional and not based on actual events.
3.2 Normal Form
Software and hardware issues are frequently identified post commercial release.
In response, developers create fixes, called patches, that are released to users for
deployment. Software development companies like Microsoft with a large user base
have adopted regular releases of new patches, known as “Patch Tuesday” [29].
On the second Tuesday of each month, patches are publicly advertised via Mi-
crosoft Security Bulletins. It is the responsibility of system administrators to be
aware of the current vulnerabilities addressed by the patches, how to appropriately
deploy them, and the potential affect to their system. The day following Patch Tues-
day is “Exploit Wednesday,” a tongue-in-cheek name as patches are released publicly
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allowing attackers to become aware of existing vulnerabilities and have a window of
opportunity to attack vulnerable networks.
Microsoft provides a rating scale for each patch based on a number of factors, in-
cluding exploitability, components affected, and degree of expected compromise. The
ratings from lowest to highest are Low, Moderate, Important, Critical (an explanation
of the rating system can be found in [30]). A knowledge base (KB) number system
is used to identify each patch in the repository. For example, two patches announced
on the March 2017 security bulletin are KB4013242 - Security Update for Microsoft
Exchange Server rated as Important, and KB4013073 - Cumulative Security Update
for Internet Explorer rated as Critical [31].
To demonstrate the applicability of normal form games in patch management,
suppose two system administrators, each independently responsible for Exchange for
email services and web services for online services such as Internet Explorer, are
planning to deploy the two aforementioned patches. Local patch management policy
dictates that patches will be deployed in one of two weeks available in the patch
window. Each week encompasses the required testing, progressive deployment, and
problem resolution prior to the start of the following week. An integer value is
assigned for each vulnerability rating in which the largest value provides the greatest
payoff: Low = 1, Moderate = 2, Important = 3, Critical = 4. The leadership team
has decided that it is not preferred that both Exchange and web services be patched
in the same week. Due to the large user base for both services and observations from
previous deployment cycles, it is desired to avoid the potential for problems with each
service occurring simultaneously.
From these policies, payoffs are assigned. First, deploying both patches in the
same week incurs a penalty of one-half the base payoff value. Similarly, postponing the
deployment of a patch leaves the network vulnerable to exploitation for an extended
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period of time, resulting in a penalty to the base payoff value. Nonetheless, postponing
a patch by one week is a more favorable approach and incurs a lesser penalty of one-
third of the base payoff value. In the event that both patch deployments are postponed
and concurrent, the penalty of postponement is incurred first, then further reduced
by the penalty due to concurrent deployment. For example, if both patches were to
be deployed in the second week, the payoff of to both players would first be reduced
by one-half, then reduced further by one-third of the new payoff.
Let player 1 denote the Exchange system administrator, player 2 denote the web
services system administrator, and N be the set of players where N = {1, 2}. Addi-
tionally, let W be the numbered week of patch deployment such that W = {1, 2}. The
action set, A, is defined as A = {aij : i ∈ N, j ∈ W}. Note that −i is used to denote
the remaining players in N such that −i 6= i. The utilities functions dependent on
the week each player deploys patches are the following:
ui(a
i
1, a
−i
2 ) = ui(a
i) (10a)
ui(a
i
1, a
−i
1 ) =
1
2
ui(a
i) (10b)
ui(a
i
2, a
−i
1 ) =
2
3
ui(a
i) (10c)
ui(a
i
2, a
−i
2 ) =
1
3
ui(a
i) (10d)
From these utilities, the normal form game matrix is formed.
Table 2. Normal Form Game Matrix
Player 2
1 2
Player 1
1 1.5, 2 3, 2.66
2 2, 4 1, 1.33
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Since u2(a
2
1, a
1
2) provides the greatest payoff for the web services system adminis-
trator, the Exchange system administrator’s best response is BR1(a
2
1) = a
1
2. Likewise,
u1(a
1
1, a
2
2) provides the greatest payoff for the Exchange system administrator, so the
web services system administrator’s best response is BR2(a
1
1) = a
2
2. Therefore, the
two pure-strategy Nash equilibria are (1, 2) and (2, 1).
3.3 Zero Sum
Wireless technology has become a commonality in businesses allowing for greater
accessibility for employees and customers alike. However, wireless devices have se-
curity limitations if access points are not carefully configured and maintained. One
method used in locating and exploiting access points is war driving, a scanning tech-
nique used to capture and evaluate packets being transmitted between wireless access
points and devices for the purpose of requesting network access. Attackers utilize this
scanning technique in order to obtain the Extended Set Identifier (ESSID), Internet
Protocol (IP) address, and Media Access Control (MAC) address of access points.
Any combination of this information provides a potential target and vector for net-
work exploitation. The following scenario demonstrates how the interaction between
attackers and defenders can be represented as a zero-sum game.
Suppose a cyber security analyst is hired by a company interested in improving
network architecture and configurations. The analyst finds that the devices in use
have not been properly maintained and identifies issues in the wireless router. Fellow
analysts have stated that a number of amateur hackers are known to practice war-
driving techniques in the vicinity of the company.
War driving consists of an attacker using active scanning, traffic sniffing, or forced
deauthentication. Active scanning is performed by sending probe packets to nearby
wireless access points and gaining information from the response. Using the tool Net-
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Stumbler, an attacker can send out a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
request to obtain an IP from the victim network. The disadvantage of this method
is that it is very noisy, making it easier for monitoring devices and access points to
recognize the flood of probe requests and create an alert for administrator action [32].
Traffic sniffing is a passive scanning method that gathers information from access
point beacon packets instead of probing. The same information can be gathered as
with war driving without the disadvantage of triggering an alert from monitoring
devices [32].
Finally, forced deauthentication uses traffic sniffing to obtain a MAC address from
the access point’s beacon packets. Once found, the attacker can send a deauthenti-
cate message using the spoofed MAC address of the access point (that is, using the
found MAC address as their own) to the broadcast address of the network, causing
connected devices to reauthenticate with the spoofed MAC address. When devices
try to reauthenticate, they will attempt to connect to the attacker’s device, in turn
providing the ESSID information to the attacker [32].
In response to these scanning methods, a defender can implement configurations
on access points. First, the access point can be configured to ignore probe requests,
negating the value gained from active scanning. Next, access points can be configured
to omit the ESSID from beacon packets, ensuring that any device that is listening for
beacons will not be able to gain the ESSID. The attacker may still be able to obtain
the MAC or IP address of the access point, but information gained is less valuable
without the ESSID. Finally, WPA2 authentication can be implemented requiring users
to authenticate with a password versus the default setting of authenticating with the
MAC address. In reality, WPA2 is the standard authentication method, however for
illustration purposes it is assumed this is not the case [32].
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The actions for the attacker are defined as Active Scanning (1), Traffic Sniffing
(2), Forced Deauthentication (3). The defender’s actions are defined as Ignore Probe
Requests (1), Omit ESSID From Beacon Packets (2), and WPA2 Authentication
(3). Let player 1 be the Defender, player 2 be the Attacker, and N = {1, 2} be
the set of players. Let δ be the set of defender actions where δ = {1, 2, 3} and α
be the set of attacker actions where α = {1, 2, 3}. Additionally, let A = {A1, A2}
such that A1 = {a1i : i ∈ δ} and A2 = {a2j : j ∈ α}. Utilities are defined as
the probability that the defender can defend against the attacker’s action, such that
u1(a
1
i , a
2
j) = −u2(a1i , a2j). Note that all probabilities provided are nominal.
Setting an access point to ignore probe requests negates active scanning, however
it serves no purpose in countering the remaining two scanning methods. Omitting the
ESSID from beacon packets is useful in masking the ESSID from the attacker but does
not eliminate the remaining information gathered, which may prove useful should
the attacker discover the ESSID via other means, namely forced deauthentication.
However, since active scanning creates more noise than traffic sniffing, there is greater
risk with lower payoff. Finally, implementing WPA2 for authentication is powerful in
keeping the attacker out of the wireless network, specifically in the event that forced
deauthentication is attempted. This does not prevent the attacker from gathering
information about the defender’s network via active scanning and traffic sniffing.
Regardless, these two methods are less useful if the attacker cannot gain access to
network [32]. The resulting game matrix is shown in Table 3.
First, observe that u2(a
1
i , a
2
1) < u2(a
1
i , a
2
2). Thus, a
2
1 is strictly dominated and can
be removed since the attacker will never play this strategy. Similarly, u1(a
1
2, a
2
j) <
u1(a
1
3, a
2
j) and a
1
2 is removed. The reduced matrix is shown in Table 4.
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Table 3. Zero-Sum Game Matrix
Player 2
a21 a
2
2 a
2
3
Player 1
a11 1,−1 −1, 1 −1, 1
a12 0.7,−0.7 0.6,−0.6 −1, 1
a13 0.9,−0.9 0.8,−0.8 1,−1
Table 4. Reduced Zero-Sum Game Matrix
Player 2
a22 a
2
3
Player 1
a11 −1, 1 −1, 1
a13 0.8,−0.8 1,−1
In the reduced form, it is clear that u1(a
1
1, a
2
j) < u1(a
1
3, a
2
j) and u2(a
1
i , a
2
3) <
u2(a
1
i , a
2
2). Therefore, a
1
1 and a
2
3 are strictly dominated and are removed. Thus,
the strict Nash equilibrium is (a11, a
1
2), or (WPA2 Authentication, Active Scanning).
3.4 Mixed Strategy
Suppose security analysts reassessed the probability of a successful defense from
the previous scenario and found that the actual probability of success by omitting the
ESSID from beacon packets is 0.8 against traffic sniffing. The revised game matrix is
shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Revised Zero-Sum Game Matrix
Player 2
a21 a
2
2 a
2
3
Player 1
a11 1,−1 −1, 1 −1, 1
a12 0.7,−0.7 0.8,−0.8 −1, 1
a13 0.9,−0.9 0.8,−0.8 1,−1
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With weak domination occurring between the defender actions a12 and a
1
3, there is
a potential for a mixed strategy played by at least one of the players as opposed to
the pure strategy Nash equilibria found in the previous game iteration. The mixed
strategy of the attacker is found first.
Let P (a21) = p1, P (a
2
2) = p2, and P (a
2
3) = 1−p1−p2. Assigning these probabilities
makes the defender indifferent in his strategies. Solving for p1 and p2 using the
expected payoff for the defender is performed as follows:
Eu1(a
1
1) = Eu1(a
1
2)
p1 − p2 − (1− p1 − p2) = 0.7p1 + 0.8p2 − (1− p1 − p2)
p1 = −1.06p2 (11)
Either p1 < 0 or p2 < 0, contradicting the fact that both values must be between
zero and one. Therefore, the probability of one of the strategies must be zero. Letting
p1 = 0, p2 = 0.5, and (1 − p1 − p2) = 0.5, the expected utilities for the attacker for
each of the defender’s actions are Eu2(a
1
1) = 1, Eu2(a
1
2) = 0.1, and Eu2(a
1
3) = −0.9.
Note that these utilities weakly dominate a21. Thus, it is not a reasonable strategy
for the attacker and can be removed by dominance of mixed strategy. The reduced
matrix can now be solved.
Eu1(a
2
2) = Eu1(a
2
3)
0.8p2 − (1− p2) = 0.8p2 + (1− p2)
p2 = 1 (12)
Therefore, the attacker’s mixed strategy is (0, 1, 0).
Since it is guaranteed that the attacker will play a22, the defender’s actions can be
evaluated easily by observing that a11 is strictly dominated by both a
1
2 and a
1
3 given
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the attacker’s mixed strategy and can be removed. Additionally, the utilities for
the two remaining defender actions are equal, indicating the mixed strategy for the
defender is (0, 0.5, 0.5). Therefore, the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria are (a12, a
2
2)
and (a13, a
3
2), with a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of {(0, 0.5, 0.5), (0, 1, 0)}.
3.5 Minmax Game
Information technology acquisitions is a difficult process requiring a balance of
cost effectiveness, system and program requirements, and sustainability. Each gain in
one may come at the cost of another, so there is risk involved in each acquisition. The
following is a scenario in which a minmax game can inform the acquisition process.
An acquisitions team assesses two devices to purchase: device one and device two.
Reports indicate that an increase in two types of attacks have been observed on their
network: attack one and attack two. In addition to the purchase cost of each device,
the team must consider the cost of repair or component replacement dependent on
the resiliency of the device against each attack.
The first device has a purchase cost of $7,000. If the device encounters attack
one, an additional cost of $1,000 is incurred and a cost of $4,000 for attack two.
The estimated cost of device one per attack is $8,000 and $11,000, respectively. The
second device has a purchase cost of $5,000. The additional cost from attack one is
$4,000 and $2,000 from attack two. The estimated cost of device two per attack is
$9,000 and $7,000, respectively.
Let player 1 denote the defender (or acquisitions team), player 2 denote the at-
tacker, and N be the set of players such that N = {1, 2}. Let δ be the set of defender’s
devices considered for purchase where δ = {1, 2} and α be the set of attacker’s at-
tack types where α = {1, 2}. The action set, A, is defined by A = {A1, A2} where
A1 = {a1i : i ∈ δ} and A2 = {a2j : j ∈ α}. The set of strategies, or the probability
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of playing each action, is defined by S = S1 × S2 = {(s1(a1i ), s2(a2j)) : a1i ∈ A1, a2j ∈
A2, s1(a
1
i ) ∈ S1, s2(a2j) ∈ S2} where the sum of all strategies utilized by a player sum
to one. Let vi be the base cost for device i and di,j be the additional cost incurred to
device i from attack j. Thus, the defender’s utility function is u1(a
1
i , a
2
j) = vi + di,j.
The Attacker’s utility is only based on the damage done to each device. Thus, the
attacker’s utility function is u2(a
1
i , a
2
j) = di,j. The game matrix is shown in Table 6
with utilities expressed in thousands of dollars.
Table 6. Acquisitions Normal Form Game Matrix
Player 2
a21 a
2
2
Player 1
a11 8, 1 11, 4
a12 9, 4 7, 2
The defender seeks to minimize the maximum cost of damages inflicted by the at-
tacker by playing a strategy in which the attacker payoff tends to zero. Alternatively,
the attacker seeks to maximize the minimum cost of device purchase and damages
to the defender. The minmax strategy and value for the defender are found in the
following manner:
max
S2
[s1(a
1
1)s2(a
2
1) + 4s1(a
1
1)s2(a
2
2) + 4s1(a
1
2)s2(a
2
1) + 2s1(a
1
2)s2(a
2
2)]
= max
S2
[s1(a
1
1)s2(a
2
1) + 4s1(a
1
1)(1− s2(a21)) + 4(1− s1(a11))s2(a21)
+ 2(1− s1(a11))(1− s2(a21))]
= max
S2
[2 + 2s1(a
1
1) + 2s2(a
2
1)− 5s1(a11)s2(a21)] (13)
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Taking the derivative with respect to s2(a
2
1) gives 2 − 5s1(a11) = 0, or s1(a11) =
0.4. Therefore, the defender’s minmax strategy is (s1(a
1
1), s1(a
1
2)) = (0.4, 0.6) with a
minmax value for the attacker of min
S1
max
S2
u2(s1(a
1
i ), s2(a
2
j)) = 2.8.
In a similar fashion, the mixed strategy for the attacker is found.
max
S1
[8s1(a
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2
1) + 11s1(a
1
1)s2(a
2
2) + 9s1(a
1
2)s2(a
2
1) + 7s1(a
1
2)s2(a
2
2)]
= max
S1
[8s1(a
1
1)s2(a
2
1) + 11s1(a
1
1)(1− s2(a21)) + 9(1− s1(a11))s2(a21)
+ 7(1− s1(a11))(1− s2(a21))]
= max
S1
[−5s1(a11)s2(a21) + 4s1(a11) + 2s2(a21) + 7] (14)
Taking the derivative with respect to s1(a
1
1) gives −5s2(a21) + 4 = 0. So, s2(a21) =
0.8. Therefore, the attacker’s minmax strategy is (s2(a
2
1), s(a
2
2)) = (0.8, 0.2), with a
minmax value for the defender of min
S2
max
S1
u1(s1(a
1
i ), s2(a
2
j)) = 8.6.
3.6 Extensive Form Game
Denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of service (DDoS) are two effective
and relatively simple attack types commonly deployed by attackers. These attacks
are prevalent because many organizations lack proper monitoring and maintenance
of their network, thereby increasing the potential for an attack. Two specific attacks
that can cause a great deal of damage are the Smurf attack, which is a form of DoS
attack, and reflection DDoS.
There are two defensive strategies that have proven effective in countering these
attacks: disabling IP broadcasting and port blocking. Disabling IP broadcasting on
network devices counters the Smurf attack by removing the attacker’s ability to spoof
an IP and rebroadcast over the victim’s network. Port blocking reduces the usable
IP space for executing either attack. This technique may not completely negate the
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possibility of a reflected DDoS attack, however it can greatly reduce the attack surface
[32]. The following scenario follows a extensive form game in which players utilize
each of the aforementioned techniques.
An organization is evaluating defensive strategies in which to implement first,
given the prevalence of the previously noted attacks. Network system administrators
have decided that disabling IP broadcasting and implementing port blocking are two
methods to consider. However, due to the time commitment of implementation and
testing, the administrators wish to execute only one strategy immediately.
Let the players and action set be defined as before in the minmax game where
the defender’s actions are disabling IP broadcasting (a11) and port blocking (a
1
2), and
the attacker’s actions are Smurf attack (a21) and reflection DDoS (a
2
2). The utility
function is defined as u2(a
2
j) = −u1(a2i ) for i ∈ δ, j ∈ α. The extensive form game
tree is shown in Figure 1. Note that the utilities based on the actions taken first by
the defender then the attacker are found at the terminal nodes at the base of the tree.
Def
Att
(−0.3, 0.3)
aA1
(−1, 1)
aA2
aD1
Att
(−0.1, 0.1)
aA1
(−0.4, 0.4)
aA2
aD2
Figure 1. Extensive Form Game Tree
To find the Nash equilibria, the extensive form game is converted to a normal
form game, called the induced normal form game [1]. The resulting game matrix is
shown in Table 7.
Note that the attacker’s strategies are shown as the combination of actions chosen
for each branch of extensive form tree. Solving the induced normal form game gives
the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (a12, (a
2
1, a
2
2)) and (a
1
2, (a
2
2, a
2
2)).
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Table 7. Induced Normal Form Game Matrix
Player 2
(a21, a
2
1) (a
2
1, a
2
2) (a
2
2, a
2
1) (a
2
2, a
2
2)
Player 1
a11 −0.3, 0.3 −0.3, 0.3 −1, 1 −1, 1
a12 −0.1, 0.1 −0.4, 0.4 −0.1, 0.1 −0.4, 0.4
Another type of solution, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, exists for this
game. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is the optimal strategy played by each
player found at each player decision node. Backward induction is used to find such
an equilbrium, starting at the terminal nodes and progressing up, or backwards in
the sequence, to the root node. Note that subgame-perfect Nash equilibria are pure-
strategy Nash equilibria, but not all pure-strategy Nash equilibria are subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria [21].
Using backward induction noting that the attacker plays the last action in the
game, the best response of the attacker given each of the defender’s actions is evalu-
ated. Since u2(a
1
1, a
2
2) = 1 and u2(a
1
2, a
2
2) = 0.4, the attacker’s best response to both
of the defender’s actions is a22. Now considering the defender’s utility between each
of the two strategies, the defender receives a better payoff by choosing to play a12.
Therefore, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria is (a12, (a
2
1, a
2
2)) and (a
1
2, (a
2
2, a
2
2)) since
both strategy pairs result in the path found by backward induction. In this case, the
subgame-perfect Nash equilbria and the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are the same.
3.7 Summary
Game theory is a valuable tool in gaining insight on an array of common cyber
security issues ranging from patch management to acquisitions. The applications in
this section are small in scope, however the modeling techniques provide relatively
simple approaches to address complex issues in the day-to-day operations of cyber
security and form a foundation for the research herein.
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IV. Methodology
4.1 Overview
This chapter develops the components and methods used to formulate a model
using game theoretical and stochastic techniques in order to evaluate the security of
a cyber system. Section 4.3 provides the fundamental components that make up the
game theoretical model while defining the states and actions for each player. Section
4.4 details the use of the game theoretical model within a discrete time Markov chain
(DTMC). Section 4.5 leverages the previous two sections to develop a cost evaluation
that provides the projected effects and risks of resource improvement allocations.
Finally, Section 4.6 discusses the limitations of each component of the model.
Note that while the action space is typically a more foundational element than
the state space in the development of a game, the state space is discussed first. The
definition of the action space in this model is dependent on how the state space is
defined, making it necessary to address the latter first. Additionally, the state space
is further discussed within the context of the DTMC. While the use of the state space
is similar in both scenarios, there are nuances for each that are addressed.
4.2 Assumptions
All data presented in this model is notional due to the lack of availability and the
sensitivity of real-world data. However, the model provides a framework from which
real-world data can be applied according to the needs of the system being evaluated.
All players of the game are assumed to be single units that act in unison towards
a specific action. While real-world cyber security units and hostile actors may consist
of a team of individuals or groups acting both in concert and independently towards
a specific goal, the complexity of the internal dynamics is not captured in this model.
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Additionally, players perform actions simultaneously, while the movement between
games occurs sequentially and is dependent on the state in which the chain begins.
Finally, each state game is independent of each other. Thus, the outcome of one state
game does not affect the outcome of another.
Cyber attack and defense are represented by states with each state having Blue and
Red policy options that create a unique tactical normal form game or “state game.”
The larger operational network security problem consists of 20 tactical normal form
state games viewed as sub-problems to the operational problem. Given a state game
and chosen Blue and Red policies, a transition to an adjoining state may occur with
a probability dependent on the Blue and Red policy action chosen. Analysis consists
of determining Red and Blue policy actions for the operational problem using game
theory and the overall likelihood of termination into one of a finite set of Blue success
or Red success states. The details of these games within each state is what follows.
4.3 Game Construction
This section defines the players of the game, the state space, and the action space
for each player. These components are then used to construct the utility function
and evaluate each game to find the Nash equilibria.
Players.
The game consists of two players, Blue and Red, representing a defensive admin-
istrator unit and a hostile, or attacker, unit. While each player may consist of a team
of individuals, their use is defined as a singular entity so that only one action may be
taken by either player at any given time. This is often referred to as unity of effort
in military operations. The set of players is defined as N = {1, 2}, where players one
and two represent Blue and Red, respectively. Using notation presented in Chapter
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2, i ∈ N indicates a player within the set N and −i ∈ N indicates all other players
of the game.
State Space.
Players perform actions that are dependent on the state they are currently in.
Each state is represented by a normal form game consisting of Blue and Red allowable
actions whose outcome dictates the progression through both the Blue and Red states
shown in Tables 8 and 9. The Blue state space follows a notional process for detecting,
identifying, and mitigating malicious activity on a network, while the Red state space
follows an attack process from scanning the environment to maintaining access and
hiding traces of malicious activity.
Table 8. Blue State Space
State Index State Name
1 Listen and Detect
2 Identify
3 Administrator Action
4 Integrity Check
Table 9. Red State Space
State Index State Name
1 Scanning
2 Exploit & Elevate Privileges
3 Attack
4 Maintain Access
5 Obfuscate
Listen and Detect - Blue State (1).
Before any action can be taken against an adversary (Red), the defender (Blue)
must first be able to detect the adversary’s presence. Therefore, this state consists of
active feedback provided by defensive sensors like intrusion detection systems (IDS),
intrusion prevention systems (IPS), and network health software.
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Identify - Blue State (2).
Once hostile activity has been detected, the defensive administrators must identify
what activity is taking place and, if possible, the point of origin. Information for
identification comes from signature recognition devices and software like firewalls and
antivirus, checking for anomalous permission changes at a root or administrative level,
or changes in resource allocation that do not coincide with normal network traffic.
The latter is typically noticed by surges of bandwidth utilization.
Administrator Actions - Blue State (3).
The certainty in identifying potentially malicious behavior informs the proper
actions taken by network or system administrators. To correct this behavior, admin-
istrators can perform actions that vary greatly in severity and complexity.
Administrators may create, remove, or edit rules on the internal or external fire-
walls, depending on mission and network requirements. They may also perform ser-
vice actions on various network devices, namely switches and routers, that adjust
or repair the configuration or the ports and services that are open. Shutting down
unused ports and services is often the most overlooked action and can often provide
a simple solution to what may seem like a complex problem.
Finally, administrators may implement less costly actions with great effect in
the form of password policies and patching. Password policies such as complexity
requirements and frequent password changes are simple solutions to common password
attacks, while patching provides solutions from hardware and software vendors to
mitigate discovered vulnerabilities, thereby limiting the attack surface with each patch
deployed.
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Integrity Check - Blue State (4).
As a final action, administrators may perform an integrity check on hashes, direc-
tories, and files to ensure that malicious manipulation has not occurred and that no
lingering software exists that may enable a hostile actor to re-engage the network.
Scanning - Red State (1).
The first step in an attack is to scan the target environment. This exploratory
action may be performed actively by pinging devices on the victim network, passively
by monitoring traffic passing into and out of the network, or by targeting users and
services of the network via social engineering or interrogating open source websites
hosted by the victim.
Exploit & Elevate Privileges - Red State (2).
Once information is obtained about the victim network, an attacker must gain
access to a device and elevate privileges, preferably to a root or administrator level,
so that they may gain greater mobility across the network.
Attack - Red State (3).
Activities that can destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, or deceive are considered at-
tacks. Common methods are denial of service (DoS) attacks and deploying malicious
software on the victim network via file transfer, e-mail, or other means of data transfer
between devices.
Maintain Access - Red State (4).
Oftentimes the initial attack is not the last action that a hostile actor performs.
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Therefore, maintaining access to the victim network is critical to executing addi-
tional or amplifying effects to the victim.
Obfuscate - Red State (5).
Before an attacker can consider their task complete, it is important that they take
action to hide traces of their activities to limit the chance of attribution or discovery.
This may be accomplished by the use of hidden files and directories to store software
that enables the attacker to maintain or regain access to the victim network, or by
altering or deleting log files thereby removing traces of actions performed.
With the state space defined for each player, it is now defined formally within the
context of the game. Let Si be the set of states of player i, where i ∈ N . Using the
Cartesian product of the Blue and Red states, let S be the complete set of states
where
S = S1 × S2 = {(s1, s2) : s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2} (15)
Action Space.
The possible actions for each player are defined by the respective state. These
actions are exclusive to a particular player state and may not be played when the
state is exited. The complete action space consists of 14 Blue actions across four
states and 21 Red actions across five states.
Blue Actions.
Table 10 provides a list of Blue actions that may be played within the correspond-
ing state. For Blue’s first state, sensor data consists of feedback from an IDS, IPS, or
related device, while sniffers consist of software used for monitoring network traffic.
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In the second state, Blue may check the permissions of users on the network to deter-
mine if someone has unauthorized administrator privileges, check resource allocation
to see if there is activity causing higher resource utilization than is typical for day-
to-day operations, or check signatures detected by devices and software like firewalls
and antivirus. In the third state, Blue has a number of possible actions that can
Table 10. Blue Action Space
State Index Action
1
1 Sensor Data
2 Sniffers
2
1 Check Permissions
2 Resource Allocation
3 Signatures
3
1 Firewall Rules
2 Network Reconfiguration
3 Password Policies
4 Port/Service Management
5 Patching
4
1 Check Logs
2 Check Hashes
3 Check Directories
4 Check Files
be categorized into configuration, policy, and maintenance. For configuration, Blue
may change or implement firewall rules, make physical or logical changes to the net-
work configuration, or shut down unused ports and services to limit points of entry
to the network. Password policies may be implemented to counter social engineering
attempts, confuse potential password cracking software used by an attacker, or mit-
igate unwarranted privilege escalation. Finally, patches may be deployed to improve
the maintenance of the network while decreasing the potential attack surface [32].
For the final state, Blue may perform various actions that check the integrity
of logs, hashes, directories, and files. Performing these actions will alert the Blue
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player to malicious activity, such as rootkits and backdoors, if executed thoroughly
and successfully.
Red Actions.
Table 9 provides a list of Red actions that can be played within the corresponding
state. In the first Red state, exploratory actions are taken which consist of sending
Table 11. Red Action Space
State Index Action
1
1 Pinging
2 Channel Monitoring
3 Traffic Monitoring
4 Open Source
2
1 Trojan Horse
2 Spoofing
3 Obtain Credentials
4 Inject
5 Overflow
3
1 Hijacking
2 Packet Manipulation
3 Flood
4 Process Manipulation
5 Malware
4
1 Covert Channels
2 Rootkit
3 Spyware
4 Backdoor
5
1 Alter Logs
2 Hidden Directories
3 Hidden Files
ping requests to external victim devices in hopes of receiving a positive response, in-
specting transmission frequencies typically originating from wireless sources (channel
monitoring), inspecting the communication moving in and out of the network (traffic
monitoring), and open source techniques like social engineering [32].
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The actions in the second state leverage the knowledge gained from the first and
allow for gaining access to the victim network and increasing the level of permissions
so that actions within the network may occur. A common technique is using a trojan
horse which masks malicious software in communication or software that seems oth-
erwise legitimate. Additionally, any system data obtained in the previous state like
IPs may be spoofed, making the attacker appear as an already established acceptable
user, or the attacker may perform an overflow attack on a vulnerable service. Finally,
the attacker may use intelligence gathered via open source means in order to steal
passwords or hashes, or by injecting code into websites owned and managed by the
victim so that administrative access can be gained [32].
Once the third stage is reached, the Red player can begin performing attacks on
the victim. The complete list of potential attacks is vast, therefore this model uses
five general categories of attacks. Note that these categories are not exhaustive as
new attack methods are frequently discovered. One potential attack method, packet
manipulation, changes the contents of the packets being received by the victim from
the attacker, creating confusion on the device and forcing it to shutdown. This type
of attack is part of a large category of attacks called denial of service (DoS) attacks.
Another DoS attack, process manipulation, is performed in a similar way as packet
manipulation, except the intended target is an active and vulnerable process like file
transfer protocol (FTP) or simple network mail protocol (SNMP). A flood consists of
overwhelming switching devices with IP or MAC addresses, forcing the device to allow
the attacker to pass through to the network while using a illegitimate address. Finally,
hijacking occurs when an attacker interrupts and steals a current active session from
a legitimate user [32].
In the fourth state, Red begins to take actions that enable maintaining access
to the victim’s network. Backdoors may be used by an attacker to bypass security
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protocols and authentication services while rootkits modify existing executable files
so that root user privileges can be maintained. Taking advantage of previous actions
like open source intelligence gathering, spyware may be installed on a victim device
in order to monitor the activities of users, such as websites accessed, search results,
and keystrokes for additional passwords and user names [32].
For the final state, the Red player masks the previous actions performed by cover-
ing their tracks throughout the victim network. This can be accomplished by altering
log files or hiding directories and files that may contain software for any of the actions
previously discussed [32].
From the aforementioned Blue and Red actions and states, 20 unique tactical
normal form state games, denoted by G(S), are created representing each state
(s1, s2) ∈ S. Since the Blue player can be in any of the four states {1, 2, 3, 4} while
the Red player can be in any of the fives states {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, 20 potential normal
form state games are constructed. For these tactical games, let NBs1 be the number of
allowable actions in Blue state s1 and N
R
s2
be the number of allowable actions in Red
state s2. Also, let α
B
(s1,i)
be the Blue action in state s1 where i = 1, . . . , N
B
s1
and let
αR(s2,j) be the Red action in state s2 where j = 1, . . . , N
R
s2
. The complete action space
is defined by
A = AB × AR
= {(αB(s1,i), α
R
(s2,j)
) : s1, s2 ∈ S, i = 1, . . . , NBs1 , j = 1, . . . , N
R
s2
} (16)
For example, αB(1,1) indicates the Blue action with index one (Sensor Data) in Blue
state 1.
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Utilities.
The utilities, or payoffs, for Blue are the probabilities of success of the played
action given the corresponding Red action, defined by
uB(α
B
(s1,i)
, αR(s2,j)) = P (α
B
(s1,i)
|αR(s2,j)) (17)
Similarly, Red utilities are the probabilities that the played action is successful.
However, each Red utility begins with a baseline probability of success, shown in
Table 12 and denoted by P (αR(s2,j)), based on factors such as complexity and resources
necessary for each action. From the baseline, the overall probability of success is
Table 12. Red Baseline Probabilities of Success
Action Baseline Probability
Pinging 0.7
Channel Monitoring 0.3
Traffic Monitoring 0.5
Open Source 0.4
Trojan Horse 0.5
Spoofing 0.3
Obtain Credentials 0.4
Inject 0.2
Overflow 0.5
Hijacking 0.3
Packet Manipulation 0.2
Flood 0.3
Process Manipulation 0.2
Malware 0.4
Covert Channels 0.1
Rootkit 0.3
Spyware 0.5
Backdoor 0.3
Alter Logs 0.2
Hidden Directories 0.5
Hidden Files 0.6
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determined by the product of the baseline probability and the probability that the
corresponding Blue action fails. Thus, the Red utility function is defined as
uR(α
B
(s1,i)
, αR(s2,j)) = P (α
R
(s2,j)
)(1− uB(αB(s1,i), α
R
(s2,j)
)) (18)
Each game is constructed as shown in Appendix A. Note that each payoff matrix
reads with the Blue actions down the rows, Red actions across the columns, and
payoffs ordered by Blue then Red. In each game, the pure strategy Nash equilibria
(PSNE) and mixed strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE) are found to determine which
strategies are dominant as well as the probability that each strategy is played. The
PSNE and MSNE for each game are presented in Appendix B.
4.4 Discrete Time Markov Chain.
In this section, the previously constructed tactical level games are used to con-
struct a DTMC, forming the larger operational network security problem. To establish
a winner of the stochastic game, states are added for both Blue and Red that are set
as “win” states, increasing the number of Blue states to five and Red to six. These
additional states are {(5, s2) : s2 ∈ S2\{6}} for a Blue win, {(s1, 6) : s1 ∈ S1\{5}} for
a Red win, and {(5, 6)} for a stalemate between the players. From the perspective
of the Blue player, state (5, 6) is not an ideal end state since Red can still accom-
plish their mission even though Blue has stopped any follow-up action, however it is
preferable to any of the Red win states.
State Transitions.
Movement between states occurs by either a forward motion or a self-transition,
however neither player can return to a previously visited state. For example, if the
game is currently in state (1, 2), a transition can be made to (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 2), or
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(2, 3), but will never transition to (1, 1). Given this rule, the transition matrix is
constructed.
Let λs be a matrix of the tactical game MSNE in state s = (s1, s2) ∈ S of size
|ABs1|×|A
R
s2
| where ABs1 ∈ A
B is Blue’s action space for state s1 ∈ S1, ARs2 ∈ A
R is Red’s
action space for state s2 ∈ S2, and each entry of λs is the product of mixed strategy
probabilities for each Blue and Red action pairing in state s. Let Λ be a matrix of
the operational network security problem MSNE of size |AB| × |AR| constructed of
all λs as shown below.
Λ =

λ(1,1) λ(1,2) · · · λ(1,|S2|)
λ(2,1) λ(2,2) · · · λ(2,|S2|)
...
...
. . .
...
λ(|S1|,1) λ(|S1|,1) · · · λ(|S1|,|S2|)

(19)
Let δBs be the strategic form utility matrix of Blue in state s = (s1, s2) ∈ S
and δRs be the strategy form utility matrix of Red, each utility matrix of equal size
as λs. Furthermore, let ∆
B be the complete operational problem strategic form
utility matrix for Blue consisting of δBs and ∆
R be the complete operational problem
strategic form utility matrix for Red consisting of δRs . Both ∆
B and ∆R are of equal
size as Λ.
∆B =

δB(1,1) δ
B
(1,2) · · · δB(1,|S2|)
δB(2,1) δ
B
(2,2) · · · δB(2,|S2|)
...
...
. . .
...
δB(|S1|,1) δ
B
(|S1|,1) · · · δ
B
(|S1|,|S2|)

(20)
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∆R =

δR(1,1) δ
R
(1,2) · · · δR(1,|S2|)
δR(2,1) δ
R
(1,2) · · · δR(2,|S2|)
...
...
. . .
...
δR(|S1|,1) δ
R
(|S1|,2) · · · δ
R
(|S1|,|S2|)

(21)
For those state games in which multiple MSNE exist, only the first listed MSNE
is used for the DTMC. Since each of the MSNE result in equal expected utilities for
each player, generality is not lost with this choice.
The probability of success for the Blue action in state k per the MSNE is denoted
by xk, while the probability of success for the Red action is denoted by yk. Then the
Blue and Red success probabilities, respectively, with matrices indexed on (a, b) are
calculated by
xk =
∑
a∈|ABs1 |
∑
b∈|ARs2 |
λk(a, b)δ
B
k (a, b) (22)
yk =
∑
a∈|ABs1 |
∑
b∈|ARs2 |
λk(a, b)δ
R
k (a, b) (23)
where x = {xk : k ∈ S} and y = {yk : k ∈ S}.
From Equations 22 and 23, the transition matrix P is constructed. Transitions
between states are denoted in the form of Pj,k, where j is the exited state and k is
the state being entered [27]. The transition probabilities are calculated by
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P(s1,s2),(s1+1,s2) = x(s1,s2)(1− y(s1,s2)) (24)
P(s1,s2),(s1,s2+1) = (1− x(s1,s2))y(s1,s2) (25)
P(s1,s2),(s1+1,s2+1) = x(s1,s2)y(s1,s2) (26)
P(s1,s2),(s1,s2) = 1− (P(s1,s2),(s1+1,s2) + P(s1,s2),(s1,s2+1) + P(s1,s2),(s1+1,s2+1)) (27)
Note that for Equation 27, since win states are absorbing states, P(s1,s2),(s1,s2) = 1
for each win state. The transition matrix partitions are shown in Appendix D due to
the size of the matrix, with the exception of P5 = I5. The transition matrix consisting
of partitions is shown below. While not explicitly shown below, overlap of columns
occurs between partitions. Thus, Equation 28 is not exactly to scale.
P =

P1 0 0 0 0
0 P2 0 0 0
0 0 P3 0 0
0 0 0 P4 0
0 0 0 0 P5

(28)
Stationary Probabilities.
Using techniques presented in Section 2.6, the stationary probabilities are found.
Let π = {πk : k ∈ S} be the stationary probability vector, and T the set of time
steps of the DTMC such that T = {1, 2, . . . , t}. Since the Markov chain is ergodic,
then lim
t→∞
Ptj,k converges to a non-negative unique stationary distribution and is indif-
ferent to the initial state of the Markov chain. [27]. The convergence of the limiting
distribution can be seen by noting the point in which the entries of the matrix Ptj,k
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stabilizes or via graphical representation of each iteration. Alternatively, the station-
ary distribution may be found by solving the system of linear equations consisting of
πP and
∑
k∈S πk = 1. For this research, the stationary probabilities are found via
the limiting probabilities method.
Once the stationary probabilities are found, an evaluation is made to determine
the probability of winning for each player based on the stationary probabilities for
their respective win states. Note that
∑
k∈S πk = 1.
Transient State Analysis.
Removing the absorbing states from P results in the transient state matrix defined
by Q, shown below. Let S ′ = {(s1, s2) : s1 ∈ S ′1, s2 ∈ S ′2} be the set of transient states.
The partitions of Q can be found in Appendix F.
Q =

Q1 0 0 0
0 Q2 0 0
0 0 Q3 0
0 0 0 Q4

(29)
From Q, the expected time in state k given the Markov chain begins in state j
is derived, denoted by mj,k. The matrix M consists of each mj,k for j, k ∈ S ′ [27].
Applying the method presented in Chapter 2,
M = (I−Q)−1 =

M1,1 M1,2
M2,1 M2,2
0 M3,2
0 M4,2

(30)
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where I is the identity matrix of equal size to Q. The partitions of M are found in
Appendix G.
The final portion of the transient state analysis is finding the probability that
state k is entered given the Markov chain begins in state j, whose matrix is denoted
by F. For each entry fj,k ∈ F and j, k ∈ S ′, fj,k is the probability of transitioning to
state k given the Markov chain begins in j determined by
fj,k =
mj,k
mk,k
(31)
Given Equation 31 [27], F is constructed from the appropriate entries found in
M, whose values can be used to evaluate the likelihood of paths and outcomes in the
stochastic game.
F =

F1,1 F1,2
F2,1 F2,2
0 F3,2
0 F4,2

(32)
4.5 Cost Evaluation
With the components of the DTMC found, an evaluation is made for the cost
incurred by Blue given the cost of the damages caused by the actions of Red and
the probability of success of actions taken by Blue. A cost evaluation is made using
DTMC and optimization, the former considering the expected cost of damage in each
state and the latter for evaluating the cost of repairing or upgrading components
corresponding with Blue actions while attempting to minimize the cost of damage by
increasing the probability of success for Blue actions.
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Evaluation via DTMC.
A cost evaluation based on the DTMC is made by utilizing the results of the mean
time in each state, M, and the expected damage cost to Blue’s system given actions
taken by Red.
Let d =
(
d1 d2 · · · d|S′2|
)
be an expected baseline damage cost vector from
actions taken by Red, where ds2,j ∈ ds2 is the baseline damage cost for action j in
Red state s2 ∈ S ′2. The baseline cost does not consider the effectiveness of Blue’s
response nor the MSNE, however it is used to find the estimated cost of damage. The
baseline damage costs are shown in Table 13. Note that these values are notional.
Table 13. Red Baseline Damage Cost
Action Baseline Damage Cost
(in thousands)
Pinging 1
Channel Monitoring 2
Traffic Monitoring 2
Open Source 5
Trojan Horse 4
Spoofing 3
Obtain Credentials 3
Inject 3.5
Overflow 5
Hijacking 6
Packet Manipulation 5
Flood 8
Process Manipulation 5
Malware 3
Covert Channels 2.5
Rootkit 5
Spyware 3
Backdoor 3
Alter Logs 2
Hidden Directories 1.5
Hidden Files 1.5
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Let cs be the estimated cost of damage in thousands of dollars incurred by Blue
given the baseline cost of Red’s action taken in state s ∈ S ′, and
c =
(
c(1,1) c(1,2) · · · c(5,6)
)T
(33)
be the vector of estimated damage cost of all states. Since the absorbing states are
designated as “win” states, no damage cost is assigned and is not considered in the
cost evaluation. The estimated cost of damage for s = (s1, s2) ∈ S ′ is defined by
cs =
∑
a∈|ABs1 |
∑
b∈|ARs2 |
(1− δBs (a, b))λs(a, b) ds2(b) (34)
Taking the product of the estimated cost of damage and the matrix of mean times
in each state gives the matrix of the total expected cost of damage in each state,
denoted by C. Equation 35 provides the method in which each entry is found and
Equation 36 shows the matrix of partitions of the expected cost per state. Each
partition is shown in Appendix I.
C(a, b) = M(a, b)c(a), ∀a ∈ |AB|,∀b ∈ |AR| (35)
C =

C1,1 C1,2
C2,1 C2,2
0 C3,2
0 C4,2

(36)
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Evaluation via Mathematical Programming.
With the expected cost of damage determined utilizing the DTMC model, a nat-
ural extension is assessing how variability in network devices may affect the original
DTMC model and the expected damage cost. Variability for this formulation consid-
ers a scenario in which components that affect the actions taken by Blue can either
be repaired or upgraded given a threshold of allowable funding. Components of sys-
tems become degraded over time, either through day-to-day use or malicious activity.
Therefore, a decision must inevitably be made as to what action must be taken for
the component.
To model a scenario of this kind, an integer program (IP) model is constructed.
If a component is repaired, it is assumed that the component is restored to full
functionality so that the corresponding probability of success for the Blue action is
unaffected. If a component is upgraded, the corresponding probability of success is
changed to that of the new component. These probabilities must be enumerated but
need not be better than before and are the expected probability given the upgrade.
An upgrade may be a full replacement of the component or a change of the existing
component that affects the performance, for example installing additional storage
capacity. If neither option is viable due to lack of funds, the component in which no
action is taken will suffer from degradation, resulting in a reduction from the original
utilities.
The objective in this scenario is to maximize the probability of success for each
component given a designated resource improvement allocation cost threshold. Let
xa, ya, and za be binary decision variables for the decision to repair, upgrade, or no
action, respectively, for a ∈ |AB|. Also, let cra and cua be the flat cost of repairing or
upgrading the component before considering the expected damage cost, respectively.
Similarly, ra, ua, and na are defined as the total cost of repair, upgrade, and no
62
action, respectively, considering both the flat cost and the expected damage cost. In
the case of the cost of no action, no flat cost is assigned and the value is based only on
the expected damage cost given the level of effectiveness for each component, µ. The
level of effectiveness is defined as the percent of the initial utility that can be expected
from each component once degraded. Let T denote the designated cost threshold for
resource improvement allocations that must not be exceeded. The matrix of Blue
utilities across the operational problem for the decision to repair or upgrade are
defined as ∆Br and ∆
B
u , respectively. Finally, Λ is as defined previously in Equation
19 and d is as defined on page 60.
Maximize
∑
a∈|AB |
∑
b∈|AR|
∆Br (a, b)(xa + µ(a)za) + ∆
B
u (a, b)ya (37a)
s.t. ra = c
r
a +
∑
b∈AR
(1−∆Br (a, b))Λ(a, b)d(b), ∀a ∈ |AB | (37b)
ua = c
u
a +
∑
b∈AR
(1−∆Bu (a, b))Λ(a, b)d(b), ∀a ∈ |AB | (37c)
na =
∑
b∈AR
(1− µ(a)∆Br (a, b))Λ(a, b)d(b), ∀a ∈ |AB | (37d)
raxa + uaya + naza ≤ T, ∀a ∈ |AB | (37e)
xa + ya + za = 1, ∀a ∈ |AB | (37f)
0 ≤∆Br (a, b) ≤ 1, ∀a ∈ |AB |,∀b ∈ |AR| (37g)
0 ≤∆Bu (a, b) ≤ 1, ∀a ∈ |AB |,∀b ∈ |AR| (37h)
0 ≤ µ(a) ≤ 1 ∀a ∈ |AB | (37i)
xa, ya, za ∈ {0, 1}, ∀a ∈ |AB | (37j)
cra, c
u
a , ra, ua, na, T ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ |AB |,∀b ∈ |AR| (37k)
Equations 37b, 37c and 37d define the total cost of repair, upgrade, and no action,
respectively. Since this model requires that only one of the decisions to repair, up-
grade, or no action be made for each component, Equation 37j restricts the sum of the
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binary variables to be one, forcing only one of the decisions to occur. Additionally,
the total cost of each decision bounded by the desired cost threshold is expressed in
Equation 37e. Finally, each ∆Br (a, b) and ∆
B
u (a, b) is a probability of Blue success and
therefore must be a real number between zero and one. Similarly, µ(a) is restricted
to be a real number value between zero and one. All other variables must be at least
zero as shown in the final constraint.
4.6 Limitations
First, the DTMC does not consider any backwards transitions to preceding states.
A backwards transition is defined as any state transition in which a player returns to
a previously visited state. While including these transitions would bring more fidelity
and real-world accuracy to the model, it also increases the complexity of the problem.
If backwards transitions are desired, the cause and effect of the transition must be
considered.
Additionally, this model does not consider the rate in which each Blue and Red
action occurs. These rates would make it possible for a player to perform multiple ac-
tions before the other player could perform a single action. Instead, Red actions and
Blue actions are assumed to be aggregated into a single uniform time step. Further-
more, time steps are treated as equal and not well defined since the rates of actions
are not defined.
4.7 Summary
This chapter provides a detailed overview on the methods and techniques used to
address the research objective posed in Section 1.3. First, underlying assumptions
are addressed so that the reasoning behind each technique is understood. Next, the
normal form games are constructed and defined with the players, action space, state
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space, and utility functions, while also defining the terms used in each of those game
components.
Using the structure and solutions from the normal form games, a DTMC model is
defined and presented. First, states are defined from the normal form games and the
formulation of each state transition is shown. Next, stationary probabilities are found
so that the probability of a win for each player can be determined. Continuing from
the transition matrix, transient state analysis can be used to determine the expected
time in each state and the probability of reaching each state given the starting state of
the Markov chain. The expected time in state values are further leveraged to provide
a cost evaluation on the expected damage cost per state given the expected time spent
in that state. Finally, an IP is defined so that a determination may be made should
repairs and upgrades to components for each action be required or desired.
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V. Analysis
5.1 Overview
Analysis provides insight into the structure of the game, ramifications of policy
choices, sensitivity to information and modifications, and impacts of resource alloca-
tion decisions. Section 5.2 begins with the construction and results of the 20 state
games with each player using randomized or mixed strategies. Sensitivity analysis
for each state game is discussed to identify the bounds of Blue utilities in which the
Nash equilibria are maintained. The calculations for player utilities and Nash equilib-
ria are performed with manual calculations, the open-source software GAMBIT [33],
and MATLAB. See Appendix J and K for the MATLAB code used.
Section 5.3 discusses the results of the application of the state game outcomes
within a DTMC. Stationary probabilities are found to determine the probability of a
Blue win, Red win, and stalemate. Transient analysis is then performed to determine
the most likely state progression of the stochastic game, appropriate policies for each
player, and an expected cost of damage to the Blue player’s network. This section
also explores how the results of the DTMC change when a player decides to play
a sub-optimal strategy in at least one of the state games. All calculations for the
DTMC are performed with MATLAB. The code can be viewed in Appendix J and
K.
Finally, Section 5.4 provides the results of determining an expected cost of damage
to the Blue player’s network and a cost evaluation should the Blue player decide to re-
pair, upgrade, or take no action for components affecting the playable strategies. This
evaluation demonstrates the affects and risk involved in determining the allocation of
funds for resource improvement. The mathematical programming calculations
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are performed using the commercial solver LINGO. The code used is shown in Ap-
pendix L.
In practice, subject matter expert (SME) experience or real-time data acquired
from an isolated test network environment is ideal to provide the greatest fidelity to
the capabilities of the network of interest. However, such resources are not available
at the time of writing, so nominal values are used. The efficacy of the model remains
unaffected since the focus of the research is on how data is evaluated by the model,
regardless of the data source.
5.2 State Game Analysis
The evaluation of the state games is performed based on the existence and num-
ber of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). While the calculations for each game
are conducted using the same techniques throughout, those games in which a unique
PSNE occurs require fewer calculations and can often be solved by inspection. Con-
sidering this case first, the state game G(1, 1) is used as an example, shown in Table
14.
Table 14. State Game G(1,1)
Red
αR(1,1) α
R
(1,2) α
R
(1,3) α
R
(1,4)
Blue
αB(1,1) 0.2, 0.56 0.1, 0.27 0.2, 0.4 0.1, 0.36
αB(1,2) 0.1, 0.63 0.2, 0.24 0.3, 0.35 0.05, 0.38
By first evaluating the payoffs for each of Red’s strategies, the utilities for Red’s
strategy αR(1,1) are strictly greater than the utilities than any other utility should Red
choose another strategy given any Blue actions. Thus, all of Red’s strategies with the
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exception of the dominant strategy αR(1,1) are removed. The state game is now reduced
to the first column as shown in Table 15.
Table 15. Reduced State Game G(1,1)
Red
αR(1,1)
Blue
αB(1,1) 0.2, 0.56
αB(1,2) 0.1, 0.63
In the reduced game, Blue’s strategy αB(1,1) strictly dominates α
B
(1,2). Thus, Blue’s
second strategy is removed and the PSNE (αB(1,1), α
R
(1,1)) is found.
For each state game in which there are multiple PSNE or no PSNE exist, the
feasibility of removing dominated strategies is evaluated first using iterated removal
of dominant strategies. For those games in which dominated strategies existed, the
game is reduced accordingly. Regardless of the existence of dominated strategies, the
mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE) are found since they are guaranteed to exist,
even in the event that no PSNE exist. To demonstrate the calculations, consider the
state game G(4, 5) shown in Table 16.
Table 16. State Game G(4,5)
Red
αR(5,1) α
R
(5,2) α
R
(5,3)
Blue
αB(4,1) 0.5, 0.1 0.3, 0.35 0.3, 0.42
αB(4,2) 0.1, 0.18 0.1, 0.45 0.1, 0.54
αB(4,3) 0.3, 0.14 0.7, 0.15 0.1, 0.54
αB(4,4) 0.1, 0.18 0.2, 0.4 0.6, 0.24
Observing Red’s strategies, it is seen that αR(5,1) is dominated by both α
R
(5,2) and
αR(5,3), therefore it is removed. From the reduced state game, Blue’s strategies are
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observed and it is seen that αB(4,2) is strictly dominated by both α
B
(4,1) and α
B
(4,4), and
weakly dominated by αB(4,3). Therefore, α
B
(4,2) is removed. The reduced state game is
shown in Table 17 with no remaining dominated pure strategies.
Table 17. Reduced State Game G(4,5)
Red
αR(5,2) α
R
(5,3)
Blue
αB(4,1) 0.3, 0.35 0.3, 0.42
αB(4,3) 0.7, 0.15 0.1, 0.54
αB(4,4) 0.2, 0.4 0.6, 0.24
The game is now ready to be evaluated for PSNE. Taking the Blue player’s per-
spective, it is expected that Red will play αR(5,3) since the greatest utility can be gained
with uR(α
B
(4,3), α
R
(5,3)) = 0.54. Therefore, Blue’s best response is BRB(α
R
(5,3)) = α
B
(4,4)
where uB(α
B
(4,4), α
R
(5,3)) = 0.6. Checking Red’s strategy decision again, it is observed
that Red’s utility can be improved with uR(α
B
(4,4), α
R
(5,2)) = 0.4. This trend continues
with each iteration, indicating that no PSNE exists for the Blue player. Evaluating
the reduced game from the Red player’s perspective results in no existing PSNE.
Therefore, the MSNE must be identified.
The reduced state game is solved first by finding the mixed strategy for Blue by
making Red indifferent to their actions. Let q1 be the probability of Blue playing
αB(4,1), q2 be the probability of α
B
(4,3), and 1− q1− q2 be the probability of αB(4,4). Since
Red is indifferent in the strategy they play, EuR(α
R
(5,2)) = EuR(α
R
(5,3)). Blue’s mixed
strategy is now found in the following manner:
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EuR(α
R
(5,2)) = EuR(α
R
(5,3))
0.35q1 + 0.15q2 + 0.4(1− q1 − q2) = 0.42q1 + 0.54q2 + 0.24(1− q1 − q2)
q1 = 0.696− 2.391q2 (38)
Substituting for q1 shows that q2 < 0, contradicting 0 ≤ q2 ≤ 1. Therefore, it must
be true that one of Blue’s strategies will never be played. By checking for a dominated
strategy by mixed strategy, let q1 = 0 and assume that each of Blue’s other two
strategies are played with equal probability. Solving, it is found that EuB(α
R
(5,2)) =
0.5(0.7) + 0.5(0.2) = 0.45 and EuB(α
R
(5,3)) = 0.5(0.1) + 0.5(0.6) = 0.35. Since these
expected utilities are each greater than uB(α
B
(4,1), α
R
(5,2)) and uB(α
B
(4,1), α
R
(5,3)), Blue will
never play αB(4,1) and can be removed. Reevaluating the further reduced state game
shows that q2 = 0.29 and 1−q2 = 0.71. Thus, Blue’s mixed strategy is (0, 0, 0.29, 0.71).
Solving Red’s mixed strategy in a similar manner results in a mixed strategy of
(0, 0.5, 0.5). Therefore, the MSNE for G(4, 5) is {(0, 0, 0.29, 0.71), (0, 0.5, 0.5)}.
Using the above techniques, the PSNE and MSNE are found for all 20 state games.
The results of the calculations are found in Appendix B.
Stability of Nash Equilibria
Sensitivity analysis of the Nash equilibria can be performed to determine the sta-
bility of the equilibria for each state game. Since Blue’s utility directly affects Red’s
utility, the sensitivity of the equilibria is determined by the interval of uB(α
B
(s1,i)
, αR(s2,j))
by which the equilibria holds. To demonstrate how this is executed, sensitivity anal-
ysis on the equilibrium for G(1, 1) is evaluated (see Table 14 on page 67 for the game
matrix).
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First, recall that for the PSNE of G(1, 1) Blue’s utility is uB(α
B
(1,1), α
R
(1,1)) = 0.2. In
order for the PSNE to remain the same it must remain a dominant strategy for both
Blue and Red. Noting the removal of dominant strategies as previously performed,
this means that uB(α
B
(1,1), α
R
(1,1)) > 0.1 or uR(α
B
(1,1), α
R
(1,1)) must remain greater than
the next best Red utility given Blue plays αB(1,1). Thus, uR(α
B
(1,1), α
R
(1,1)) > 0.4.
Recalling the utility function for Red defined in Section 4.3, the following must
hold true:
P (αR(1,1))(1− uB(αB(1,1), αR(1,1)) > 0.4 (39)
Substituting P (αR(1,1)) for the corresponding value in Section 4.3 and solving for
uB(α
B
(1,1)),
0.7(1− uB(αB(1,1), αR(1,1)) > 0.4
uB(α
B
(1,1)) < 0.4286 (40)
Therefore, the PSNE for G(1, 1) is maintained as long as 0.1 < uB(α
B
(1,1), α
R
(1,1)) <
0.4286 or 0.1 < uB(α
B
(1,2), α
R
(1,1)) < 0.4571. Note that the lower bound on the equilib-
rium Blue utility is formed by a comparison with the Blue utility across other Blue
strategies while the upper bound is formed by a comparison with the Red utility
across other Red strategies.
To show how this method applies to a state game in which no PSNE exists,
recall G(4, 5) previously shown in Table 16. The sensitivity for the Nash equilibria
(αB(4,3), α
R
(5,2)) and (α
B
(4,3), α
R
(5,3)) are shown while the remaining two MSNE action pairs
can be evaluated in the same manner. Proceeding as before, the Blue utilities are
evaluated first so that a lower bound may be established, followed by the Red utilities.
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For the equilibrium (αB(4,3), α
R
(5,2)), observing the utilities across the Blue strate-
gies given Red plays (αR(5,2)) shows that uB(α
B
(4,3), α
R
(5,2)) > 0.3. For (α
B
(4,3), α
R
(5,3)),
an interesting case occurs when the Blue utility for this equilibrium is not strictly
greater than the next best Blue utility given Red plays αR(5,2). In this case, decreasing
the Blue utility does not affect the equilibrium since doing so increases the corre-
sponding Red utility and does not assist in dominance among Blue strategies. Thus,
uB(α
B
(4,3), α
R
(5,3)) > 0.
Evaluating the sensitivity of the Red utilities, in order to maintain the equilibria
given Blue plays αB(4,3), the following must be true:
P (αR(5,2))(1− uB(αB(4,3), αR(5,2)) > 0.14 (41a)
P (αR(5,3))(1− uB(αB(4,3), αR(5,3)) > 0.15 (41b)
Substituting for αR(5,2) and α
R
(5,3),
0.5(1− uB(αB(4,3), αR(5,2)) > 0.14
uB(α
B
(4,3), α
R
(5,2)) < 0.72 (42a)
0.6(1− uB(αB(4,3), αR(5,3)) > 0.15
uB(α
B
(4,3), α
R
(5,3)) < 0.75 (42b)
Therefore, (αB(4,3), α
R
(5,2)) remains an equilibrium for 0.4 < uB(α
B
(4,3), α
R
(5,3)) < 0.75, and
(αB(4,3), α
R
(5,2)) for 0 < uB(α
B
(4,3), α
R
(5,3)) < 0.75.
Using this technique, the stability of the Nash equilibria for each state can be eval-
uated by considering thresholds of strategy domination across Blue and Red strate-
gies.
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5.3 DTMC Analysis
Using the previously found Nash equilibria for each tactical normal form game, a
DTMC is constructed. Mixed strategies shown in Appendix B are used as weights on
the utilities associated with the Nash equilibria in order to determine the probability
of Blue success and Red success in each state game.
To demonstrate how the determination of the probability of success for each
player leverages the MSNE as weights, the state game G(4, 5) is used with MSNE of
{(0, 0, 0.29, 0.71), (0, 0.5, 0.5)}. The associated utility values are provided in Appendix
A. Using Equations 22 and 23 found in Section 4.4,
x(4,5) = 0.29(0.5)(0.7) + 0.29(0.5)(0.1) + 0.71(0.5)(0.2) + 0.71(0.5)(0.6)
= 0.4 (43a)
y(4,5) = 0.29(0.5)(0.15) + 0.29(0.5)(0.54) + 0.71(0.5)(0.4) + 0.71(0.5)(0.24)
= 0.3273 (43b)
Substituting these values into Equations 24 through 27 in Section 5.3,
P(4,5),(4,6) = (1− x(4,5))y(4,5) = 0.1964 (44a)
P(4,5),(5,5) = x(4,5)(1− y(4,5)) = 0.2691 (44b)
P(4,5),(5,6) = x(4,5)y(4,5) = 0.1309 (44c)
P(4,5),(4,5) = 1− P(4,5),(4,6) − P(4,5),(5,5) − P(4,5),(5,6) = 0.4037 (44d)
These probabilities account for all one-step transitions and sum to one. This result
as well as the remaining transition probabilities for other states are calculated in the
same manner. These probabilities are used to determine each of the transitions in
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the DTMC, resulting in the transition matrix shown in Section 5.3 and Appendix D.
A visual representation of the DTMC is shown in Appendix E.
The transition matrix is iterated over 40 time steps with the initial state, π0,
established at (1, 1) so that the probability of a win for each player can be deter-
mined. The selection of 40 time steps is made to ensure ample time steps to show
convergence to the stationary probabilities while the initial state provides a realistic
evaluation of an attacker-defender scenario. As shown in Figure 2, the limit converged
at approximately t = 35 with |P35i,j −P40i,j| < 0.001.
For the example given in Appendix D the results of π between t = 35 and t = 40,
the following stationary probabilities are found for the Blue win states (5, s2) for
s2 ∈ S2\{6}, Red win states (s1, 6) for s1 ∈ S1\{5}, and the stalemate state (5, 6),
as shown in Figure 45. Lines that do not converge to zero indicate the stationary
probabilities for the absorbing win states.
Figure 2. Stationary Probabilities Over 40 Time Steps
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lim
t→∞
π0P
t
i,j = π =

π(1,6) = 0.0189
π(2,6) = 0.2219
π(3,6) = 0.2419
π(4,6) = 0.0486
π(5,1) = 0.0003
π(5,2) = 0.0006
π(5,3) = 0
π(5,4) = 0.2766
π(5,5) = 0.1587
π(5,6) = 0.0325
0, else
(45)
From Equation 45, the first four probabilities listed represent the probability of
a Red win, the next five probabilities represent the probability of a Blue win, and
the final probability represents the probability of a stalemate. Summing across the
stationary probabilities representing each player’s win state shows that the game will
result in a win for Blue with probability 0.4362, Red with probability 0.5313, and
stalemate with probability 0.0325.
Additionally, by setting the initial state vector to be each possible state of the
game, excluding the terminating states, the conditional probability of winning for
each player is found. Table 18 provides the probability pairing of Blue winning and
Red winning, respectively, given each player’s current state in the game. For example,
if the Blue player is currently in state 1 and the Red player is currently in state 2, the
probability of Blue winning is 0.3707 while the probability of Red winning is 0.5993.
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These conditional probabilities provide a clear operational view at each moment of
the game.
Table 18. Conditional Player Win Probabilities
Red State
1 2 3 4 5
Blue State
1 (0.4362, 0.5313) (0.3707, 0.5993) (0.3215, 0.651) (0.2796, 0.6966) (0, 1)
2 (0.6793, 0.2803) (0.5077, 0.4563) (0.3618, 0.6073) (0.3618, 0.6073) (0, 1)
3 (0.8845, 0.0716) (0.8664, 0.0863) (0.8491, 0.1012) (0.7494, 0.1867) (0, 1)
4 (0.8984, 0.061) (0.8902, 0.0659) (0.8902, 0.0659) (0.8902, 0.0659) (0.4512, 0.3293)
Using the techniques presented in Section 4.4, transient analysis is performed.
The resulting transient state matrix Q, matrix M consisting of the expected time
periods is state j given the chain starts in state i for all i, j ∈ S, and the matrix F
consisting of probabilities of entering state j given the chain starts in state i for all
i, j ∈ S are presented in Appendices F, G, and H, respectively.
In determining the most likely path of the stochastic game, the matrix F in con-
junction with P is used by following a path from a given starting state. The path is
determined by following the path through states in which the probability of ever en-
tering the state j given the chain started in state i is greatest. Of particular concern
is the chain that begins in state (1, 1) as this is the logical start of a cyber attacker-
defender scenario given the fact that a defender (Blue) cannot reasonably reach a
later state without first detecting the actions of the attacker (Red).
Given that the chain begins at state (1, 1), a transition can be made to state (1, 2),
(2, 1), or (2, 2) as observed from P. Of these potential entering states, F indicates
that it is most likely that state (1, 2) will be entered next from (1, 1) with conditional
probability 0.6914. Next, state (1, 2) can transition to states (1, 3), (2, 2), or (2, 3).
Again referring to F, state (2, 3) is the most likely to be entered with conditional
76
probability 0.5574. Continuing in this manner indicates that the most likely path
for the stochastic game is (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4), then (4, 4). Since F only
considers transient states, it is at this point where the utility of the matrix ends. To
determine the final state of the game, P is reviewed to identify the most likely end
state. From this, it is determined that the game is most likely to conclude in state
(5, 4) and result in a win for Blue since P(4,4),(5,4) = 0.375. Note that among the
possible win states from state (4, 4) (that is, states (5, 4), (5, 5), (5, 6), and (4, 6)),
state (5, 4) has the greatest stationary distribution.
Table 19 provides a summary of the most likely path moving from state i to
candidate states state j1, j2, or j3 with the respective conditional probabilities. Entries
marked with a * denote the chosen conditional path.
Table 19. Summary of Most Likely Path
State i State j1 : fi,j1 State j2 : fi,j2 State j3 : fi,j3
(1, 1) *(1, 2) : 0.6914 (2, 1) : 0.1358 (2, 2) : 0.4048
(1, 2) (1, 3) : 0.4255 (2, 2) : 0.4048 *(2, 3) : 0.5574
(2, 3) *(2, 4) : 0.7705 (3, 3) : 0.1152 (3, 4) : 0.4056
(2, 4) (2, 5) : 0.2675 *(3, 4) : 0.4056 (3, 5) : 0.2173
(3, 4) (3, 5) : 0.2173 *(4, 4) : 0.461 (4, 5) : 0.1475
(4, 4) (4, 5) : 0.1475 *(5, 4) : 0.375 (5, 5) : 0.125
Finding the most likely paths from initial states to “win” states in this manner
is useful in prioritizing updates to systems or software. By identifying the most
probable path, cyber security analysts can determine where a weak component may
lie and assess the feasibility of improving the components performance so that a more
desirable path is achieved. In the example above, an analyst may consider making
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improvements in sensor performance so that detection may occur sooner with greater
chance of success, or improve how resource allocation is assessed to allow for greater
accuracy in identifying abnormal behavior.
Evaluating Sub-Optimal Strategies
Analysis is performed to determine the affect on the results of the operational
problem should a player decide to play a sub-optimal strategy in at least one of the
tactical games. This is accomplished by changing the strategy played by Blue in
G(1, 1) to αB(1,2) and G(2, 1) to α
B
(2,3), both of which are deviations from the strict
PSNE found in each state game and are early in the state sequence progression. A
comparison of the stationary distributions found for the initial operational problem
and the stationary distributions of the operational problem with sub-optimal strate-
gies is conducted using 40 time steps as the projected point of convergence. The
convergence to the stationary probabilities with the sub-optimal Blue strategies is
shown in Figure 3 with |P35i,j − P40i,j| < 0.001. A comparison of the initial stationary
probabilities to the sub-optimal Blue strategies probabilities is shown in Table 20.
Figure 3. Stationary Probabilities with Sub-optimal Blue Strategies
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Table 20. Initial Stationary Probabilities vs Sub-optimal
(1,6) (2,6) (3,6) (4,6) (5,1) (5,2) (5,3) (5,4) (5,5) (5,6)
Initial 0.0189 0.2219 0.2419 0.0486 0.0003 0.0006 0 0.2766 0.1587 0.0325
Sub-Optimal 0.0233 0.2452 0.2632 0.0395 0 0 0 0.2459 0.1523 0.0305
These sub-optimal strategies result in a Blue win with probability 0.3982, a Red
win with probability 0.5713, and stalemate with probability 0.0305. Note that the
probability of a Blue win decreased by 0.038 while the probability of a Red win
increased by 0.04. While this example provides a relatively small decrease in the
probability of a Blue win, the decrease in probability is compounded as Blue con-
tinues to play additional sub-optimal strategies while the probability of a Red win
will continue to increase. Should Red decide to play sub-optimal strategies, the same
effect is observed where Red’s probability of winning decreases while Blue’s win prob-
ability would increase. Thus, the results of playing a sub-optimal strategy show the
robustness of playing a Nash equilibrium when the opponent does not.
Player Policies
Policy analysis is performed from the perspective of the Blue player since it is
desired to determine the resiliency of the defender’s network. The same policy analysis
can be performed from the perspective of the Red player should an analyst wish to
evaluate a potential attack strategy.
As previously stated, the original DTMC model utilizes the MSNE from each tac-
tical game to determine a generalized outcome of the operational problem. However,
it is unlikely that a player will desire to play strategies based on randomization. In
the moment in which the game is played, a decision must be made as to which strat-
egy will be played. Taking the Blue’s perspective, it is desired that the probability of
a Red win be minimized while maximizing Blue’s probability of winning. As such, it
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was necessary to minimize Red’s expected utility in each stage game whenever possi-
ble assuming that the Red player played the mixed strategy as defined by the MSNE.
Note that this does not mean that the expected utility of the Blue player increases
since the mixed strategy of the Red player remains unchanged. There is usefulness in
information operations that make it unclear to the Red player which policy is best by
denying information or allowing unclear or ambiguous information about what policy
is best.
To accomplish this goal, the following policy is adopted:
• Evaluate each strategy’s affect on the opponent’s minmax value given the oppo-
nent’s mixed-strategy. Play the strategy that minimizes the opponent’s minmax
value.
• If the opponent’s minmax value is the same for each strategy, play the strategy
with the greatest mixed-strategy probability.
• If the player’s mixed strategy is uniformly distributed and no difference among
affects on the opponent’s minmax value exist, play the strategy that is most
preferable, as determined by the player based on factors such as ease of execution
and required resources.
To demonstrate, the policy is applied to state game G(4, 5) as shown in Table 16.
Recall that the mixed strategy of Red is (0, 0.5, 0.5) and the MSNE exists for Blue
strategies αB(4,3) and α
B
(4,4). Let µR(α
B
(s1,i)
) be the minmax value for Red given Blue
chooses to play αB(s1,i), where s1 ∈ S1 and i = 1, . . . , N
B
s1
. First setting P (αB(4,3)) = 1
and P (αB(4,4)) = 0,
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µR(α
B
(4,3)) = 0.5uR(α
B
(4,3), α
R
(5,2)) + 0.5uR(α
B
(4,3), α
R
(5,3))
= 0.5(0.15) + 0.5(0.54)
= 0.345 (46)
Now setting P (αB(4,3)) = 0 and P (α
B
(4,4)) = 1,
µR(α
B
(4,4)) = 0.5uR(α
B
(4,4), α
R
(5,2)) + 0.5uR(α
B
(4,4), α
R
(5,3))
= 0.5(0.4) + 0.5(0.24)
= 0.32 (47)
Since µR(α
B
(4,4)) < µR(α
B
(4,3)), the policy states that Blue should play α
B
(4,4).
Continuing in this manner across all state games, the DTMC is reevaluated to
observe the difference in the stationary probabilities, thereby determining whether the
probability of a Blue win increases. Figure 4 shows the convergence to the stationary
probabilities with |P35i,j − P40i,j| < 0.001, and Table 21 provides a comparison of the
initial models stationary probabilities to the Blue policy.
Table 21. Initial Stationary Probabilities vs Blue Policy
(1,6) (2,6) (3,6) (4,6) (5,1) (5,2) (5,3) (5,4) (5,5) (5,6)
Initial 0.0189 0.2219 0.2419 0.0486 0.0003 0.0006 0 0.2766 0.1587 0.0325
Policy 0.0189 0.2219 0.2418 0.0478 0.0003 0.0006 0 0.2768 0.16 0.0319
Summing the stationary probabilities of each of the Red and Blue win states, it is
found that the probability of Red winning is 0.5304, the probability of Blue winning
is 0.4377, and the probability of a stalemate is 0.0319. Note that comparing to the
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Figure 4. Stationary Probabilities with Blue Policy
initial model, the probability of Blue winning increased by 0.0015 and the probability
of Red winning decreased by 0.0009. While the difference for each is small, it is
determined that the policy is effective in improving Blue’s probability of winning for
this example and may be more profound given other instances.
5.4 Cost Analysis
The established DTMC model is used in conjunction with a vector of baseline
damage cost values due to Red actions to determine the expected cost of damage
to the Blue player’s network in each state. Using the baseline damage costs shown
in Table 13 and Equation 36 in Section 4.5, the expected damage costs are found
for each state. The matrix of damage costs in thousands of dollars is provided in
Appendix I.
Recall from the matrices F and P it was determined that the most likely path of
the operational problem given the chain begins in state (1, 1) was (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 3),
(2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 4), and (5, 4). The associated damage cost for each state is shown
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in Table 22. Summing across the row of damage costs indicates that the expected
damage cost for the path is $21,536.
Table 22. Damage Cost of Most Likely Path
State (1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (3, 4) (4, 4)
Damage Cost 1.2346 4.2545 11.1477 2.3912 0.7375 1.7701
To demonstrate how both the most likely path and the expected damage cost can
be affected by changes in the Blue player’s utilities, a scenario is explored in which the
Blue player must decide whether to repair or upgrade existing components that affect
the utilities of each of the Blue player’s actions given a specified monetary threshold
for resource improvement allocation. It is assumed that should a component be
repaired, it is returned to full capacity and the initial utility is not affected. However,
if there are insufficient funds for repairing or upgrading a component, no action is
taken causing a degradation in the effectiveness for the given component. An integer
program model is developed that considers the MSNE of each state game, the baseline
damage cost from each of Red’s strategies, the Blue strategic form game matrix for
the operational problem consisting of the initial utilities, the Blue strategic form game
matrix for the operational problem consisting of utilities if components upgraded, and
the cost of repairing and upgrading each component. The integer program used is
provided in Section 4.5.
The optimal solution of the integer program indicates that most components
should receive an upgrade with few exceptions. A summary of the optimal solu-
tion and the decision made for each action is shown in Table 23. Note that all cost
values are in thousands of dollars.
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It is clear from the table that the damage cost, consisting of the product of the
operational problem MSNE, expected damage cost from actions taken by the Red
player, and the probability of failure of the Blue player’s action, has a great affect on
the expected cost associated with each action.
A sensitivity analysis between the cost of the decision made for each of the Blue
player’s actions and the alternative decisions is provided in Table 24. The difference
of these values provide bounds on the expected cost in which a change in decision may
be potentially be made. Note that negative difference values indicate the amount in
which the allocation threshold would need to decrease before a potential no action
decision for the given component.
Table 23. IP Optimal Solution Summary
Action Decision Baseline Cost Damage Cost Expected Cost
αB(1,1) No Action 0 6.27144 6.27144
αB(1,2) Upgrade 2 6.9772 8.9772
αB(2,1) Upgrade 1 2.2 3.2
αB(2,2) Upgrade 2 7.2 9.2
αB(2,3) Upgrade 4 4.125 8.125
αB(3,1) No Action 0 0.3 0.3
αB(3,2) No Action 0 4.56703 4.56703
αB(3,3) Repair 0.75 3.57932 4.32932
αB(3,4) Repair 1.5 0.4573 1.9573
αB(3,5) Repair 2 5.25006 7.25006
αB(4,1) Upgrade 1.3 3 4.3
αB(4,2) Upgrade 1 3.5 4.5
αB(4,3) Upgrade 1 2.19575 3.19575
αB(4,4) Upgrade 1 2.58575 3.58575
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Given the observation of the affect of the damage cost on the total expected cost,
it is likely that most of the decisions recommended for this instance of the IP could
shift if the alternative solution were to provide a lesser probability of failure against
each of the Red player’s actions without increasing the baseline cost. The utilities
Table 24. IP Sensitivity Analysis
Action Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Decision Difference Diffference
Cost Cost Cost From 1 From 2
αB(1,1) 9.7228 12.2296 6.27144 3.45136 5.95816
αB(1,2) 7.7772 6.02856 8.9772 -1.2 -2.94864
αB(2,1) 2.35 1.38 3.2 -0.85 -1.82
αB(2,2) 10.0375 7.135 9.2 0.8375 -2.065
αB(2,3) 9.2875 5.625 8.125 1.1625 -2.5
αB(3,1) 2.8 6.3 0.3 2.5 6
αB(3,2) 9.22964 11.7926 4.56703 4.66261 7.22557
αB(3,3) 5.58976 3.59394 4.32932 1.26044 -0.73538
αB(3,4) 8.46437 0.4737 1.9573 6.50707 -1.4836
αB(3,5) 9.64293 5.83219 7.25006 2.39287 -1.41787
αB(4,1) 4.25 2.96 4.3 -0.05 -1.34
αB(4,2) 5 3.8 4.5 0.5 -0.7
αB(4,3) 3.261 2.2958 3.19575 0.06525 -0.89995
αB(4,4) 3.639 2.7242 3.58575 0.05325 -0.86155
for the actions that correspond with each of the upgraded components are used to
provide an updated DTMC model to determine if a better conditional path can be
found while decreasing the expected damage cost associated with the path from the
initial solution to the operational network security problem, as well as assessing the
inherent risk given the decision made for each component.
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For the updated model, each state game is solved with the updated utilities in
the applicable state games, the results of which are found in Appendix C. Using the
same methods as before, the DTMC is evaluated with the new Nash equilibria. A
comparison of the probabilities to the initial model and the resulting convergence of
the stationary probabilities with |P35i,j−P40i,j| < 0.001 are shown in Figure 5 and Table
25, respectively.
Table 25. Initial Stationary Probabilities vs Allocation Utilities
(1,6) (2,6) (3,6) (4,6) (5,1) (5,2) (5,3) (5,4) (5,5) (5,6)
Initial 0.0189 0.2219 0.2419 0.0486 0.0003 0.0006 0 0.2766 0.1587 0.0325
Allocation 0.0362 0.1268 0.2567 0.035 0.0014 0.0017 0 0.3068 0.1991 0.0362
Figure 5. Stationary Probabilities with Allocation Utilities
From Table 25, the first four columns show the comparison of the probabilities for
a Red win, the next five columns show the comparison of the probabilities for a Blue
win, and the final column shows the comparison of the probability for a stalemate.
Thus, summing across the respective columns for the row of stationary probabilities
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from the updated tactical game utilities, the probability of a Blue win is 0.5452,
the probability of a Red win is 0.4547, and the probability of stalemate is 0.0362.
Note that Blue’s probability of winning increases by 0.109 and Red’s probability of
winning decreases by 0.0766. These changes are not relatively large, however Blue’s
win probability will continue to increase should additional funds become available for
resource improvement.
Evaluating the updated matrices F and P, it is found that the most likely path of
the game given the chain starts in state (1, 1) is (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 3), (4, 4), and
(5, 4). A summary of the likely path and conditional probabilities is shown in Table
26. Each candidate transition state selected for the likely path is indicated by an *.
Table 26. Summary of Allocation Most Likely Path
State i State j1 : fi,j1 State j2 : fi,j2 State j3 : fi,j3
(1, 1) *(1, 2) : 0.6914 (2, 1) : 0.1358 (2, 2) : 0.3918
(1, 2) (1, 3) : 0.4756 (2, 2) : 0.3918 *(2, 3) : 0.5153
(2, 3) *(2, 4) : 0.7341 (3, 3) : 0.1199 (3, 4) : 0.4825
(2, 4) (2, 5) : 0.1928 *(3, 4) : 0.4825 (3, 5) : 0.225
(3, 4) (3, 5) : 0.225 *(4, 4) : 0.5114 (4, 5) : 0.1681
(4, 4) (4, 5) : 1339 *(5, 4) : 0.37 (5, 5) : 1384
The expected damage cost per state within the most likely path is shown in Table
27 with all values in thousands of dollars. Summing each of the damage cost values
gives a total expected damage cost of $20,834 for the likely path with the updated
utilities, resulting in a decrease of $702 from the initial solution of the operational
problem.
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Table 27. Damage Cost of Allocation Most Likely Path
State (1, 1) (1, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (3, 4) (4, 4)
Damage Cost 1.2963 4.53 10.3061 1.7619 0.8774 2.062
Thus, the decision made for this instance based on the optimal solution of the IP
provides an improvement on the initial operational network security problem for the
probability of winning for the Blue player, the conditional path, and the associated
total expected cost of damages. This may not always be the case and may change
substantially if the cost threshold for resource allocation is adjusted.
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VI. Conclusions and Future Research
6.1 Conclusions
This research provides a novel approach to cyber system analysis and network
improvement resource allocation by developing a stochastic game theoretical model
for evaluating the resiliency of a defender’s network. The operational network se-
curity problem is solved by implementing game theory to determine the solution of
20 tactical normal form game sub-problems, each of which consist of subsets of 14
defender (Blue) player strategies and 21 attacker (Red) player strategies. The Nash
equilibria from each of these state games are used to determine the state transitional
probabilities in a discrete-time Markov chain, in turn providing the probability of a
Blue win and Red win determined by the stationary distribution of the Markov chain.
In turn, transient analysis provides an evaluation of the expected damage cost due
to each Red attack strategy. Information gained from the normal form games and
the Markov chain are utilized in an integer program to advise the Blue player on
repairing or upgrading networks components that are used in each of the Blue strate-
gies. The results from the integer program provide an updated Markov chain that
indicate an improvement in the probability of a Blue win given that Blue performs
the recommended decisions.
The results of the research provide answers to the following questions, as originally
posed in Chapter I.
Question 1: How can the resiliency of a cyber system be evaluated
using game theoretical and stochastic modeling?
The possible actions to be taken by the Blue and Red actors are specified. These
lists are constructed in such a way that they are only as specific as needed so that
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analysis can be performed. For example, instead of specifying the inspection of intru-
sion detection or intrusion prevention systems, a generalized action of inspection of
sensor devices, as done in this research, can be used that encompasses both of these
devices as well as any other components used in this action.
Next, the actions should be grouped together as states such that the states follow
in a logical order through the desired attack and defend posturing. This enables a
progression through an attacker-defender scenario from detection and scanning for
the defender and attacker, respectively, to the conclusion of the scenario in which
either the defender or attacker may “win.” Each state can then be formed into a
normal form game based on the actions taken in each state so that the success of
each player can be determined in the form of Nash equilibria.
Finally, the construction and evaluation of the state games provides a natural
segue to Markov chains in which the mixed strategies of each player and state game
can be used as weights on the utilities corresponding with the Nash equilibria, thereby
providing the probability of success in any given state for each player. These success
probabilities form the basis of the state transition probabilities, enabling the construc-
tion of a transition matrix in which stationary probabilities indicate the probability
of each player winning the stochastic game over a discrete time interval.
Question 2: Given the current state of a cyber system and potential
actions of a malicious actor, how may cyber security analysts evaluate
the likelihood of success or failure of defensive cyber actions?
Stationary probabilities of a discrete time Markov chain formed from the state
games provide a determination of the probability of winning for each player. The
success and failure of a potential strategy policy over the course of the stochastic
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game is found via the convergence of the transition matrix to each player’s win states
over a discrete set of time steps.
Question 3: In what manner can a cost analysis be performed on an
upgrade or replacement of cyber defense hardware and software while
in turn evaluating the effects on the system?
The results of the state games can be utilized as data points within an integer pro-
gram to provide a cost analysis of upgrading or replacing cyber defense hardware and
software. The integer program should consist of each of the total costs for upgrading
and replacing components, the utilities of the Blue player for each of the decisions, the
Nash equilibria found from state game analysis, and an estimated damage cost due
to the actions performed by the Red player against the Blue network. The results
of the mathematical programming model are used to update the properties of the
discrete-time Markov chain, providing the degree of improvement in the resiliency of
the Blue player’s network given the resource allocation decision taken. Furthermore,
the developed formulation is highly scalable and allows analysts to adapt the model
according to their network needs.
6.2 Future Research
While this research proposes a model in which each of the stated research objec-
tives are met, greater fidelity can be gained by considering alterations to the model.
This section proposes such alterations should a researcher wish to continue the devel-
opment of the proposed stochastic game model.
This research uses a single instance of the operational problem with selected alter-
ations to illustrate concepts like sub-optimal player strategies and stability of Nash
equilibria. The significance of the model can be explored further by experimenting
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on alternative instances of the game. These experiments may consider alternative
pricing on the decision to upgrade or replace components or changes in each player’s
utilities in the tactical games.
Attack graphs provide analysis on the likelihood of a given attack strategy taken
by a malicious actor. The model formed in this research lends well to the use of attack
graphs, however the specificity of the attacker’s actions and the inability to bypass
or step backwards in states make the direct translation to an attack graph infeasible.
To correct this, one may consider the specific actions that may be taken for each
of the attacker’s strategies and determine which of these actions allow for a win for
the attacker without the necessity of entering each state.
Another point of improvement on this model would be to consider an additional
strategy to take no action. This strategy should be made available to either player
at any point in the game. Doing so allows the player to observe the opponent, gain
knowledge of the opponent’s strategies, and update the knowledge of the game so that
a better informed strategy decision can be made. When considering this strategy for
the cost evaluation, a discount factor to the Blue utilities should be applied to account
for degradation of components due to inaction.
Additionally, this model does not allow either player to transition to an earlier
state in the Markov chain. This was a necessary assumption so that a foundational
model could be constructed, however this is not how a real-world attacker-defender
scenario would proceed. At any point in either player’s sequence, they may be able
to perform an action that negates the progress made by the opponent. A model that
accounts for this possibility would provide better insight on the interaction between
players over the course of the game.
Finally, it is unlikely that either player would have complete knowledge of their
opponents utility for each strategy. As such, a factor of uncertainty in the form
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of bounded utilities would be appropriate. In doing so, one will need to consider
the instability of Nash equilibria and equilibria could be represented to inform the
Markov chain.
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Appendix A. Tactical Normal Form State Games
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Appendix B. Pure and Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria
State PSNE MSNE
(1,1) αB(1,1), α
R
(1,1) (1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0)
(1,2) αB(1,1), α
R
(2,1) (0.5, 0.5), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
αB(1,2), a
R
(2,1)
(1,3) αB(1,1), α
R
(3,1) (0.286, 0.714), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
αB(1,2), α
R
(3,1)
(1,4) αB(1,1), α
R
(4,3) (1, 0), (0, 0, 0.5, 0.5)
αB(1,1), α
R
(4,4)
(1,5) αB(1,1), α
R
(5,3) (0.5, 0.5), (0, 0, 1)
αB(1,2), α
R
(5,3)
(2,1) αB(2,2), α
R
(1,1) (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0)
(2,2) Does Not Exist (0, 0.25, 0.75), (0.5, 0, 0, 0, 0.5)
(2,3) Does Not Exist (0, 0.9, 0.1), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
(0.643, 0, 0.357), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
(2,4) αB(2,3), α
R
(4,3) (0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 0)
(2,5) αB(2,1), α
R
(5,3) (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)
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State PSNE MSNE
(3,1) Does Not Exist (0, 0.93, 0, 0.07, 0), (0.67, 0, 0, 0.33)
(3,2) Does Not Exist (0, 0, 0.116, 0, 0.884), (0.7, 0, 0.3, 0, 0)
(3,3) Does Not Exist (0, 0.6749, 0, 0.0149, 0.3102), (0.455, 0, 0.152, 0, 0.393)
(3,4) αB(3,5), α
R
(4,3) (0, 0, 0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 0.5, 0.5)
αB(3,5), α
R
(4,4)
(3,5) αB(3,1), α
R
(5,3) (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2), (0, 0, 1)
αB(3,2), α
R
(5,3)
αB(3,3), α
R
(5,3)
αB(3,4), α
R
(5,3)
αB(3,5), α
R
(5,3)
(4,1) αB(4,1), α
R
(1,1) (1, 0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0)
(4,2) αB(4,1), α
R
(2,5) (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25), (0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
αB(4,2), α
R
(2,5)
αB(4,3), α
R
(2,5)
αB(4,4), α
R
(2,5)
(4,3) αB(4,1), α
R
(3,5) (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25), (0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
αB(4,2), α
R
(3,5)
αB(4,3), α
R
(3,5)
αB(4,4), α
R
(3,5)
(4,4) Does Not Exist (0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0)
(0.08, 0.92, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0)
(4,5) Does Not Exist (0, 0, 0.29, 0.71), (0, 0.5, 0.5)
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Appendix C. Nash Equilibria from Allocation IP
State PSNE MSNE
(1,1) αB(1,2), α
R
(1,1) (0, 1), (1, 0, 0, 0)
(1,2) αB(1,1), α
R
(2,1) (1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
(1,3) Does Not Exist (0.33, 0.66), (0.9333, 0, 0.0667, 0, 0)
(1,4) αB(1,1), α
R
(4,3) (1, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0)
(1,5) αB(1,1), α
R
(5,3) (0.5, 0.5), (0, 0, 1)
αB(1,2), α
R
(5,3)
(2,1) αB(2,2), α
R
(1,1) (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0)
(2,2) Does Not Exist (0.3125, 0, 0.6875), (0.4286, 0, 0.5714, 0, 0)
(0, 0.3125, 0.6875), (0.4286, 0, 0.5714, 0, 0)
(2,3) αB(2,2), α
R
(3,1) (0.375, 0.625, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
αB(2,3), α
R
(3,1) (0.5833, 0, 0.4167), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
(0, 0.5, 0.5), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0)
(2,4) αB(2,3), α
R
(4,3) (0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 0)
(2,5) αB(2,1), α
R
(5,3) (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)
(3,1) αB(3,2), α
R
(1,1) (0, 0.5, 0, 0.5, 0), (0.5, 0, 0.5, 0)
αB(3,2), α
R
(1,3) (0, 0.2857, 0, 0.7143, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0)
αB(3,4), α
R
(1,1)
αB(3,4), α
R
(1,3)
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State PSNE MSNE
(3,2) Does Not Exist (0, 0, 0.0685, 0, 0.9315), (0.7, 0, 0.3, 0, 0)
(3,3) Does Not Exist (0, 0, 0, 0.7586, 0.2414), (0.625, 0, 0, 0, 0.375)
(3,4) αB(3,5), α
R
(4,3) (0, 0, 0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 0.5, 0.5)
αB(3,5), α
R
(4,4)
(3,5) αB(3,1), α
R
(5,3) (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2), (0, 0, 1)
αB(3,2), α
R
(5,3)
αB(3,3), α
R
(5,3)
αB(3,4), α
R
(5,3)
αB(3,5), α
R
(5,3)
(4,1) αB(4,1), α
R
(1,1) (1, 0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0)
(4,2) αB(4,1), α
R
(2,5) (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25), (0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
αB(4,2), α
R
(2,5)
αB(4,3), α
R
(2,5)
αB(4,4), α
R
(2,5)
(4,3) αB(4,1), α
R
(3,5) (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25), (0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
αB(4,2), α
R
(3,5)
αB(4,3), α
R
(3,5)
αB(4,4), α
R
(3,5)
(4,4) αB(4,2), α
R
(4,3) (0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0)
(4,5) Does Not Exist (0, 0, 0.5077, 0.4923), (0, 0.4167, 0.5833)
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Appendix D. Transition Matrix Partitions
P1 =

(1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 5) (1, 6) (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5) (2, 6)
(1, 1) 0.352 0.448 0 0 0 0 0.088 0.1120 0 0 0 0
(1, 2) 0 0.48 0.32 0 0 0 0 0.12 0.08 0 0 0
(1, 3) 0 0 0.608 0.192 0 0 0 0 0.152 0.048 0 0
(1, 4) 0 0 0 0.34 0.06 0 0 0 0 0.51 0.09 0
(1, 5) 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
(1, 6) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

P2 =

(2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5) (2, 6) (3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (3, 6)
(2, 1) 0.357 0.343 0 0 0 0 0.153 0.147 0 0 0 0
(2, 2) 0 0.4888 0.3613 0 0 0 0 0.0863 0.0638 0 0 0
(2, 3) 0 0 0.7 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2, 4) 0 0 0 0.42 0.18 0 0 0 0 0.28 0.12 0
(2, 5) 0 0 0 0 0.414 0.486 0 0 0 0 0.046 0.054
(2, 6) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

P3 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (3, 6) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5) (4, 6)
(3, 1) 0.4079 0.2242 0 0 0 0 0.2374 0.1305 0 0 0 0
(3, 2) 0 0.4997 0.2903 0 0 0 0 0.1328 0.0772 0 0 0
(3, 3) 0 0 0.5121 0.1426 0 0 0 0 0.2701 0.0752 0 0
(3, 4) 0 0 0 0.34 0.06 0 0 0 0 0.51 0.09 0
(3, 5) 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
(3, 6) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

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P4 =

(4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5) (4, 6) (5, 1) (5, 2) (5, 3) (5, 4) (5, 5) (5, 6)
(4, 1) 0.3183 0.6318 0 0 0 0 0.0168 0.033 0 0 0 0
(4, 2) 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4, 3) 0 0 0.6 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(4, 4) 0 0 0 0.375 0.125 0 0 0 0 0.375 0.125 0
(4, 5) 0 0 0 0 0.4037 0.1964 0 0 0 0 0.2691 0.1309
(4, 6) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

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Appendix E. Discrete-Time Markov Chain
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Appendix F. Transient State Matrix Partitions
Q1 =

(1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 5) (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5)
(1, 1) 0.352 0.448 0 0 0 0.088 0.112 0 0 0
(1, 2) 0 0.48 0.32 0 0 0 0.12 0.08 0 0
(1, 3) 0 0 0.608 0.192 0 0 0 0.152 0.048 0
(1, 4) 0 0 0 0.34 0.06 0 0 0 0.51 0.09
(1, 5) 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0

Q2 =

(2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5) (3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5)
(2, 1) 0.357 0.343 0 0 0 0.153 0.147 0 0 0
(2, 2) 0 0.4888 0.3613 0 0 0 0.0863 0.0638 0 0
(2, 3) 0 0 0.7 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0
(2, 4) 0 0 0 0.42 0.18 0 0 0 0.28 0.12
(2, 5) 0 0 0 0 0.414 0 0 0 0 0.046

Q3 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(3, 1) 0.4079 0.2242 0 0 0 0.2374 0.1305 0 0 0
(3, 2) 0 0.4997 0.2903 0 0 0 0.1328 0.0772 0 0
(3, 3) 0 0 0.5121 0.1426 0 0 0 0.2701 0.0752 0
(3, 4) 0 0 0 0.34 0.06 0 0 0 0.51 0.09
(3, 5) 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0

Q4 =

(4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(4, 1) 0.3183 0.6318 0 0 0
(4, 2) 0 0.5 0.5 0 0
(4, 3) 0 0 0.6 0.4 0
(4, 4) 0 0 0 0.375 0.125
(4, 5) 0 0 0 0 0.4037

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Appendix G. Mean Time in Transient State Matrix
Partitions
M1,1 =

(1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 5) (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5)
(1, 1) 1.5432 1.3295 1.0853 0.3157 0.0316 0.2112 0.7918 1.8579 1.3285 0.4565
(1, 2) 0 1.9231 1.5699 0.4567 0.0457 0 0.4514 1.8518 1.4893 0.5276
(1, 3) 0 0 2.551 0.7421 0.0742 0 0 1.2925 1.5322 0.5846
(1, 4) 0 0 0 1.5152 0.1515 0 0 0 1.3323 0.6419
(1, 5) 0 0 0 0 1.6667 0 0 0 0 0

M1,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(1, 1) 0.0546 0.223 0.2361 0.6146 0.3622 0.019 0.0975 0.3244 0.7375 0.2474
(1, 2) 0 0.0778 0.1053 0.6546 0.4038 0 0.0207 0.1119 0.6184 0.2284
(1, 3) 0 0 0 0.65 0.4163 0 0 0 0.5304 0.2093
(1, 4) 0 0 0 0.5652 0.3722 0 0 0 0.4612 0.182
(1, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

M2,1 =

(1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 5) (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5)
(2, 1) 0 0 0 0 0 1.5552 1.0434 1.2564 0.6499 0.1996
(2, 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.956 2.3553 1.2183 0.3745
(2, 3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.3333 1.7241 0.5296
(2, 4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7241 0.5296
(2, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.7065

M2,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(2, 1) 0.4018 0.817 0.6223 0.4102 0.1863 0.1399 0.4988 1.2013 1.1784 0.3089
(2, 2) 0 0.3372 0.4562 0.6154 0.3339 0 0.0896 0.4851 0.8675 0.2747
(2, 3) 0 0 0 0.7315 0.4586 0 0 0 0.5969 0.2355
(2, 4) 0 0 0 0.7315 0.4586 0 0 0 0.5969 0.2355
(2, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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M3,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(3, 1) 1.6888 0.7569 0.4503 0.0973 0.0097 0.5881 1.385 2.1813 1.5296 0.3353
(3, 2) 0 1.9989 1.1891 0.257 0.0257 0 0.5311 1.8524 1.5383 0.3612
(3, 3) 0 0 2.0494 0.4428 0.0443 0 0 1.3839 1.4937 0.3799
(3, 4) 0 0 0 1.5152 0.1515 0 0 0 1.2364 0.4878
(3, 5) 0 0 0 0 1.6667 0 0 0 0 0

M4,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(4, 1) 0 0 0 0 0 1.4668 1.8533 2.3166 1.4827 0.3108
(4, 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2.5 1.6 0.3354
(4, 3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.5 1.6 0.3354
(4, 4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6 0.3354
(4, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.6769

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Appendix H. Probability of Entering State Matrix
Partitions
F1,1 =

(1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 5) (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5)
(1, 1) 1 0.6914 0.4255 0.2084 0.0189 0.1358 0.4048 0.5574 0.7705 0.2675
(1, 2) 0 1 0.6154 0.3014 0.0274 0 0.2308 0.5555 0.8638 0.3092
(1, 3) 0 0 1 0.4898 0.0445 0 0 0.3878 0.8887 0.3426
(1, 4) 0 0 0 1 0.0909 0 0 0 0.7727 0.3762
(1, 5) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

F1,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(1, 1) 0.0323 0.1116 0.1152 0.4056 0.2173 0.013 0.0488 0.1297 0.461 0.1475
(1, 2) 0 0.0389 0.0514 0.432 0.2423 0 0.0103 0.0448 0.3865 0.1362
(1, 3) 0 0 0 0.429 0.2498 0 0 0 0.3315 0.1248
(1, 4) 0 0 0 0.373 0.2233 0 0 0 0.2883 0.1085
(1, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

F2,1 =

(1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 5) (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5)
(2, 1) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.5334 0.3769 0.3769 0.117
(2, 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.7066 0.7066 0.2193
(2, 3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.3103
(2, 4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.3103
(2, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

F2,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(2, 1) 0.2379 0.4087 0.3037 0.2707 0.1118 0.0954 0.2494 0.4805 0.7365 0.1842
(2, 2) 0 0.1687 0.2226 0.4062 0.2003 0 0.0448 0.194 0.5422 0.1638
(2, 3) 0 0 0 0.4828 0.2751 0 0 0 0.373 0.1404
(2, 4) 0 0 0 0.4828 0.2751 0 0 0 0.373 0.1404
(2, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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F3,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(3, 1) 1 0.3787 0.2197 0.0642 0.0058 0.4009 0.6925 0.8725 0.956 0.2
(3, 2) 0 1 0.5802 0.1696 0.0154 0 0.2655 0.741 0.9615 0.2154
(3, 3) 0 0 1 0.2923 0.0266 0 0 0.5535 0.9336 0.2266
(3, 4) 0 0 0 1 0.0909 0 0 0 0.7727 0.2909
(3, 5) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

F4,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(4, 1) 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.9267 0.9267 0.9267 0.1853
(4, 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.2
(4, 3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.2
(4, 4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.2
(4, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

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Appendix I. Damage Cost Per State Matrix Partitions
C1,1 =

(1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 5) (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5)
(1, 1) 1.2346 4.2545 5.2096 0.3789 0.0474 0.1478 3.0288 11.1477 2.3912 0.6163
(1, 2) 0 6.1538 7.5353 0.548 0.0685 0 1.7265 11.1105 2.6807 0.7123
(1, 3) 0 0 12.2449 0.8905 0.1113 0 0 7.7551 2.758 0.7892
(1, 4) 0 0 0 1.8182 0.2273 0 0 0 2.3981 0.8666
(1, 5) 0 0 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 0

C1,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(1, 1) 0.0983 1.2953 0.8282 0.7375 0.5432 0.0181 0.4876 0.9731 1.7701 0.2226
(1, 2) 0 0.4519 0.3692 0.7855 0.6056 0 0.1034 0.3358 1.4843 0.2056
(1, 3) 0 0 0 0.78 0.6244 0 0 0 1.273 0.1884
(1, 4) 0 0 0 0.6783 0.5583 0 0 0 1.1069 0.1638
(1, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

C2,1 =

(1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 5) (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4) (2, 5)
(2, 1) 0 0 0 0 0 1.0886 3.991 7.5385 1.1698 0.2695
(2, 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.4817 14.132 2.1929 0.5052
(2, 3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 3.1034 0.715
(2, 4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.1034 0.715
(2, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.3038

C2,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(2, 1) 0.7239 4.7446 2.1826 0.4922 0.2794 0.1329 2.4938 3.6038 2.8282 0.278
(2, 2) 0 1.9584 1.5998 0.7385 0.5008 0 0.448 1.4552 2.0821 0.2472
(2, 3) 0 0 0 0.8777 0.6879 0 0 0 1.4325 0.2119
(2, 4) 0 0 0 0.8777 0.6879 0 0 0 1.4325 0.2119
(2, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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C3,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(3, 1) 3.0425 4.3957 1.5792 0.1168 0.0146 0.5587 6.9249 6.5438 3.671 0.3018
(3, 2) 0 11.6087 4.1705 0.3083 0.0385 0 2.6553 5.5572 3.692 0.3251
(3, 3) 0 0 7.1876 0.5314 0.0664 0 0 4.1516 3.5849 0.3419
(3, 4) 0 0 0 1.8182 0.2273 0 0 0 2.9673 0.439
(3, 5) 0 0 0 0 2.5 0 0 0 0 0

C4,2 =

(3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (3, 5) (4, 1) (4, 2) (4, 3) (4, 4) (4, 5)
(4, 1) 0 0 0 0 0 1.3935 9.2666 6.9499 3.5584 0.2797
(4, 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 7.5 3.84 0.3018
(4, 3) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.5 3.84 0.3018
(4, 4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.84 0.3018
(4, 5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.5092

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Appendix J. MATLAB - Stochastic Game Data
1 %% Blue payoffs per stage game %%
Blue1 1 = [0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1;
3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.05];
BFail1 1 = 1−Blue1 1;
5
Blue1 2 = [0.2 0.3 0 0 0.3;
7 0.2 0.3 0 0.2 0.3];
BFail1 2 = 1 − Blue1 2;
9
Blue1 3 = [0.2 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6;
11 0.2 0.4 0 0.3 0.4];
BFail1 3 = 1 − Blue1 3;
13
Blue1 4 = [0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5;
15 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3];
BFail1 4 = 1 − Blue1 4;
17
Blue1 5 = [0 0 0;
19 0 0 0];
BFail1 5 = 1 − Blue1 5;
21
Blue2 1 = [0 0 0 0.1;
23 0.3 0.1 0.2 0;
0 0 0 0];
25
% %Updated from IP
27 % Blue2 1 = [0 0 0 0.1;
% 0.2 0.1 0.1 0;
29 % 0 0 0 0];
% %%
109
31
BFail2 1 = 1 − Blue2 1;
33
Blue2 2 = [0 0.1 0.4 0.4 0;
35 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3;
0.2 0 0 0.2 0.1];
37
%Updated from IP
39 % Blue2 2 = [0 0.1 0.4 0.4 0;
% 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2;
41 % 0.4 0 0 0.3 0.4];
% %%
43
BFail2 2 = 1 − Blue2 2;
45
Blue2 3 = [0 0 0 0 0;
47 0 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.2;
0 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.7];
49
%%Updated from IP
51 % Blue2 3 = [0 0 0 0 0;
% 0 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.4;
53 % 0 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.6];
% %%
55
BFail2 3 = 1 − Blue2 3;
57
Blue2 4 = [0 0.6 0 0.1;
59 0.1 0 0 0.4;
0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5];
61
%%Updated from IP
110
63 % Blue2 4 = [0 0.6 0 0.1;
% 0.1 0 0 0.3;
65 % 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5];
% %%
67
BFail2 4 = 1 − Blue2 4;
69
Blue2 5 = [0.1 0.1 0.1;
71 0 0 0;
0 0 0];
73
%%Updated from IP
75 % Blue2 5 = [0.1 0.1 0.1;
% 0 0 0;
77 % 0 0 0];
% %%
79
BFail2 5 = 1 − Blue2 5;
81
Blue3 1 = [0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2;
83 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.1;
0 0 0 0.6;
85 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.3;
0 0 0 0];
87 BFail3 1 = 1 − Blue3 1;
89 Blue3 2 = [0.2 0.4 0 0.3 0.7;
0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.6;
91 0 0 0.7 0 0;
0.1 0.5 0 0.1 0.2;
93 0.3 0 0 0 0.7];
BFail3 2 = 1 − Blue3 2;
111
95
Blue3 3 = [0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3;
97 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3;
0.1 0 0 0 0;
99 0.3 0 0.6 0.4 0.3;
0 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.8];
101 BFail3 3 = 1 − Blue3 3;
103 Blue3 4 = [0.4 0 0 0;
0.4 0.2 0.2 0;
105 0 0.2 0 0;
0.2 0.6 0.6 0.5;
107 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5];
BFail3 4 = 1 − Blue3 4;
109
Blue3 5 = [0 0 0;
111 0.2 0 0;
0 0 0;
113 0 0 0;
0 0 0];
115 BFail3 5 = 1 − Blue3 5;
117 Blue4 1 = [0.05 0 0 0;
0 0 0 0;
119 0 0 0 0;
0 0 0 0];
121
%%Updated from IP
123 % Blue4 1 = [0.05 0 0 0;
% 0 0 0 0;
125 % 0 0 0 0;
% 0 0 0 0];
112
127 % %%
129 BFail4 1 = 1 − Blue4 1;
131 Blue4 2 = [0 0.1 0.5 0.2 0;
0.4 0 0.4 0 0;
133 0 0 0 0 0;
0 0 0 0 0];
135
%%Updated from IP
137 % Blue4 2 = [0 0.1 0.5 0.2 0;
% 0.5 0 0.4 0 0;
139 % 0 0 0 0 0;
% 0 0 0 0 0];
141 % %%
143 BFail4 2 = 1 − Blue4 2;
145 Blue4 3 = [0.5 0.1 0 0.2 0;
0 0 0 0.3 0;
147 0 0 0 0.2 0;
0 0 0 0.5 0];
149
%%Updated from IP
151 % Blue4 3 = [0.5 0.1 0 0.2 0;
% 0 0 0 0.4 0;
153 % 0 0 0 0.3 0;
% 0 0 0 0.4 0];
155 % %%
157 BFail4 3 = 1 − Blue4 3;
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159 Blue4 4 = [0.1 0.1 0 0.2;
0 0.1 0.5 0.5;
161 0 0 0 0;
0 0 0 0];
163
%Updated from IP
165 % Blue4 4 = [0.1 0.1 0 0.2;
% 0 0.2 0.5 0.6;
167 % 0 0 0 0;
% 0 0 0 0];
169 % %%
171 BFail4 4 = 1 − Blue4 4;
173 Blue4 5 = [0.5 0.3 0.3;
0.1 0.1 0.1;
175 0.3 0.7 0.1;
0.2 0.2 0.6];
177
%%Updated from IP
179 % Blue4 5 = [0.5 0.3 0.3;
% 0.1 0.3 0.2;
181 % 0.2 0.8 0.3;
% 0.1 0.1 0.8];
183 % %%
185 BFail4 5 = 1 − Blue4 5;
187 BluePayoffs = {Blue1 1 Blue1 2 Blue1 3 Blue1 4 Blue1 5;
Blue2 1 Blue2 2 Blue2 3 Blue2 4 Blue2 5;
189 Blue3 1 Blue3 2 Blue3 3 Blue3 4 Blue3 5;
Blue4 1 Blue4 2 Blue4 3 Blue4 4 Blue4 5};
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191
BlueFail = {BFail1 1 BFail1 2 BFail1 3 BFail1 4 BFail1 5;
193 BFail2 1 BFail2 2 BFail2 3 BFail2 4 BFail2 5;
BFail3 1 BFail3 2 BFail3 3 BFail3 4 BFail3 5;
195 BFail4 1 BFail4 2 BFail4 3 BFail3 4 BFail4 5};
197 %% Red baseline probabilities of success to establish payoffs %%
RedBaseline1 = [0.7 0.3 0.5 0.4];
199 RedBaseline2 = [0.5 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.5];
RedBaseline3 = [0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4];
201 RedBaseline4 = [0.1 0.3 0.5 0.3];
RedBaseline5 = [0.2 0.5 0.6];
203
RedBaseline = {RedBaseline1 RedBaseline2 RedBaseline3 RedBaseline4 RedBaseline5};
205
%% Red payoffs using Blue payoffs and Red baseline probabilities %%
207 RedPayoffs = {};
for i = 1 : size (BluePayoffs,1)
209 for j = 1 : size (BluePayoffs, 2)
tempBlue = BluePayoffs{i,j};
211 [n,m] = size(tempBlue);
tempRedBaseline = RedBaseline{1,j};
213 tempRedPayoff = zeros(n,m);
for ii = 1 : n
215 for jj = 1 : m
tempRedPayoff(ii,jj) = tempRedBaseline(:,jj)∗(1 − tempBlue(ii,jj));
217 end
end
219 RedPayoffs(i, j) = {tempRedPayoff};
end
221 end
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223 %% Set−up for DTMC %%
[n,m] = size(BluePayoffs);
225 BMNE = sym(’x’, [n+1 m+1]); %Blue Mixed Nash Equilibrium
RMNE = sym(’y’, [n+1 m+1]); %Red Mixed Nash Equilibrium
227
x1 1 = BluePayoffs{1,1}(1,1);
229 y1 1 = RedPayoffs{1,1}(1,1);
231 x1 2 = 0.5∗BluePayoffs{1,2}(1,1) + 0.5∗BluePayoffs{1,2}(2,1);
y1 2 = 0.5∗RedPayoffs{1,2}(1,1) + 0.5∗RedPayoffs{1,2}(2,1);
233
x1 3 = 0.286∗BluePayoffs{1,3}(1,1) + 0.714∗BluePayoffs{1,3}(2,1) ;
235 y1 3 = 0.286∗RedPayoffs{1,3}(1,1) + 0.714∗RedPayoffs{1,3}(2,1);
237 x1 4 = 0.5∗BluePayoffs{1,4}(1,3) + 0.5∗BluePayoffs{1,4}(1,4) ;
y1 4 = 0.5∗RedPayoffs{1,4}(1,3) + 0.5∗RedPayoffs{1,4}(1,4);
239
x1 5 = 0.5∗BluePayoffs{1,5}(1,3) + 0.5∗BluePayoffs{1,5}(2,3) ;
241 y1 5 = 0.5∗RedPayoffs{1,5}(1,3) + 0.5∗RedPayoffs{1,5}(2,3);
243 x1 6 = 0;
y1 6 = 1;
245
x2 1 = BluePayoffs{2,1}(2,1) ;
247 y2 1 = RedPayoffs{2,1}(2,1);
249 x2 2 = 0.125∗BluePayoffs{2,2}(2,1) + 0.125∗BluePayoffs{2,2}(2,5) + 0.375∗BluePayoffs{2,2}(3,1)
+ 0.375∗BluePayoffs{2,2}(3,5) ;
y2 2 = 0.125∗RedPayoffs{2,2}(2,1) + 0.125∗RedPayoffs{2,2}(2,5) + 0.375∗RedPayoffs{2,2}(3,1) +
0.375∗RedPayoffs{2,2}(3,5);
251
x2 3 = 0.9∗BluePayoffs{2,3}(2,1) + 0.1∗BluePayoffs{2,3}(3,1);
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253 y2 3 = 0.9∗RedPayoffs{2,3}(2,1) + 0.1∗RedPayoffs{2,3}(3,1);
255 x2 4 = BluePayoffs{2,4}(3,3);
y2 4 = RedPayoffs{2,4}(3,3);
257
x2 5 = BluePayoffs{2,5}(1,3);
259 y2 5 = RedPayoffs{2,5}(1,3);
261 x2 6 = 0;
y2 6 = 1;
263
x3 1 = 0.6231∗BluePayoffs{3,1}(2,1) + 0.3069∗BluePayoffs{3,1}(2,4) + 0.0469∗BluePayoffs
{3,1}(4,1) + 0.0231∗BluePayoffs{3,1}(4,4);
265 y3 1 = 0.6231∗RedPayoffs{3,1}(2,1) + 0.3069∗RedPayoffs{3,1}(2,4) + 0.0469∗RedPayoffs
{3,1}(4,1) + 0.0231∗RedPayoffs{3,1}(4,4);
267 x3 2 = 0.0812∗BluePayoffs{3,2}(3,1) + 0.0348∗BluePayoffs{3,2}(3,3) + 0.6188∗BluePayoffs
{3,2}(5,1) + 0.2652∗BluePayoffs{3,2}(5,3);
y3 2 = 0.0812∗RedPayoffs{3,2}(3,1) + 0.0348∗RedPayoffs{3,2}(3,3) + 0.6188∗RedPayoffs
{3,2}(5,1) + 0.2652∗RedPayoffs{3,2}(5,3);
269
x3 3 = 0.3071∗BluePayoffs{3,3}(2,1) + 0.1026∗BluePayoffs{3,3}(2,3) + 0.2652∗BluePayoffs
{3,3}(2,5) + 0.0068∗BluePayoffs{3,3}(4,1) + 0.0023∗BluePayoffs{3,3}(4,3) + 0.0059∗
BluePayoffs{3,3}(4,5) + 0.1411∗BluePayoffs{3,3}(5,1) + 0.0472∗BluePayoffs{3,3}(5,3) +
0.1219∗BluePayoffs{3,3}(5,5);
271 y3 3 = 0.3071∗RedPayoffs{3,3}(2,1) + 0.1026∗RedPayoffs{3,3}(2,3) + 0.2652∗RedPayoffs
{3,3}(2,5) + 0.0068∗RedPayoffs{3,3}(4,1) + 0.0023∗RedPayoffs{3,3}(4,3) + 0.0059∗
RedPayoffs{3,3}(4,5) + 0.1411∗RedPayoffs{3,3}(5,1) + 0.0472∗RedPayoffs{3,3}(5,3) +
0.1219∗RedPayoffs{3,3}(5,5);
273 x3 4 = 0.5∗BluePayoffs{3,4}(5,3) + 0.5∗BluePayoffs{3,4}(5,4);
y3 4 = 0.5∗RedPayoffs{3,4}(5,3) + 0.5∗RedPayoffs{3,4}(5,4);
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275
x3 5 = 0.2∗BluePayoffs{3,5}(1,3) + 0.2∗BluePayoffs{3,5}(2,3) + 0.2∗BluePayoffs{3,5}(3,3) + 0.2∗
BluePayoffs{3,5}(4,3) + 0.2∗BluePayoffs{3,5}(5,3);
277 y3 5 = 0.2∗RedPayoffs{3,5}(1,3) + 0.2∗RedPayoffs{3,5}(2,3) + 0.2∗RedPayoffs{3,5}(3,3) + 0.2∗
RedPayoffs{3,5}(4,3) + 0.2∗RedPayoffs{3,5}(5,3);
279 x3 6 = 0;
y3 6 = 1;
281
x4 1 = BluePayoffs{4,1}(1,1) ;
283 y4 1 = RedPayoffs{4,1}(1,1);
285 x4 2 = 0.25∗BluePayoffs{4,2}(1,5) + 0.25∗BluePayoffs{4,2}(2,5) + 0.25∗BluePayoffs{4,2}(3,5) +
0.25∗BluePayoffs{4,2}(4,5);
y4 2 = 0.25∗RedPayoffs{4,2}(1,5) + 0.25∗RedPayoffs{4,2}(2,5) + 0.25∗RedPayoffs{4,2}(3,5) +
0.25∗RedPayoffs{4,2}(4,5);
287
x4 3 = 0.25∗BluePayoffs{4,3}(1,5) + 0.25∗BluePayoffs{4,3}(2,5) + 0.25∗BluePayoffs{4,3}(3,5) +
0.25∗BluePayoffs{4,3}(4,5);
289 y4 3 = 0.25∗RedPayoffs{4,3}(1,5) + 0.25∗RedPayoffs{4,3}(2,5) + 0.25∗RedPayoffs{4,3}(3,5) +
0.25∗RedPayoffs{4,3}(4,5);
291 x4 4 = BluePayoffs{4,4}(2,3);
y4 4 = RedPayoffs{4,4}(2,3);
293
x4 5 = 0.145∗BluePayoffs{4,5}(3,2) + 0.145∗BluePayoffs{4,5}(3,3) + 0.355∗BluePayoffs{4,5}(4,2)
+ 0.355∗BluePayoffs{4,5}(4,3);
295 y4 5 = 0.145∗RedPayoffs{4,5}(3,2) + 0.145∗RedPayoffs{4,5}(3,3) + 0.355∗RedPayoffs{4,5}(4,2) +
0.355∗RedPayoffs{4,5}(4,3);
297 x4 6 = 0;
y4 6 = 0;
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299
x5 1 = 1;
301 y5 1 = 0;
303 x5 2 = 1;
y5 2 = 0;
305
x5 3 = 1;
307 y5 3 = 0;
309 x5 4 = 1;
y5 4 = 0;
311
x5 5 = 1;
313 y5 5 = 0;
315 x5 6 = 1;
y5 6 = 0;
317
%% Cost to Blue where first value is O&M, %%
319 %% second is attack damage cost times probability of %%
%% Blue failure. Values in thousands. %%
321 c1 1 = 1∗(BlueFail{1,1}(1,1));
c1 2 = 0.5∗(4∗BlueFail{1,2}(1,1)) + 0.5∗(4∗BlueFail{1,2}(2,1));
323 c1 3 = 0.286∗(6∗BlueFail{1,3}(1,1)) + 0.714∗(6∗BlueFail{1,3}(2,1));
c1 4 = 0.5∗(3∗BlueFail{1,4}(1,3))+0.5∗(3∗BlueFail{1,4}(1,4));
325 c1 5 = 0.5∗(1.5∗BlueFail{1,5}(1,3)) + 0.5∗(1.5∗BlueFail{1,5}(2,3)) ;
327 c2 1 = 1∗BlueFail{2,1}(2,1);
c2 2 = 0.125∗(4∗BlueFail{2,2}(2,1))+0.125∗(5∗BlueFail{2,2}(2,5))+0.375∗(4∗BlueFail{2,2}(3,1))
+0.375∗(5∗BlueFail{2,2}(3,5));
329 c2 3 = 0.9∗(6∗BlueFail{2,3}(2,1))+0.1∗(6∗BlueFail{2,3}(3,1));
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c2 4 = 3∗BlueFail{2,4}(3,3);
331 c2 5 = 1.5∗BlueFail{2,5}(1,3);
333 c3 1 = 0.6231∗(1∗BlueFail{3,1}(2,1))+0.3069∗(5∗BlueFail{3,1}(2,4))+0.0469∗(1∗BlueFail
{3,1}(4,1))+0.0231∗(5∗BlueFail{3,1}(4,4));
c3 2 = 0.812∗(4∗BlueFail{3,2}(3,1))+0.0348∗(3∗BlueFail{3,2}(3,3))+0.6188∗(4∗BlueFail{3,2}(5,1)
)+0.2652∗(3∗BlueFail{3,2}(5,3));
335 c3 3 = 0.3071∗(6∗BlueFail{3,3}(2,1))+0.1026∗(8∗BlueFail{3,3}(2,3))+0.2652∗(3∗BlueFail
{3,3}(2,5))+0.0068∗(6∗BlueFail{3,3}(4,1))+0.0023∗(8∗BlueFail{3,3}(4,3))+0.0059∗(3∗BlueFail
{3,3}(4,5))+0.1411∗(6∗BlueFail{3,3}(5,1))+0.0472∗(8∗BlueFail{3,3}(5,3))+0.1219∗(3∗BlueFail
{3,3}(5,5));
c3 4 = 0.5∗(3∗BlueFail{3,4}(5,3))+0.5∗(3∗BlueFail{3,4}(5,4));
337 c3 5 = 0.2∗(1.5∗BlueFail{3,5}(1,3))+0.2∗(1.5∗BlueFail{3,5}(2,3))+0.2∗(1.5∗BlueFail{3,5}(3,3))
+0.2∗(1.5∗BlueFail{3,5}(4,3))+0.2∗(1.5∗BlueFail{3,5}(5,3));
339 c4 1 = 1∗BlueFail{4,1}(1,1);
c4 2 = 0.25∗(5∗BlueFail{4,2}(1,5))+0.25∗(5∗BlueFail{4,2}(2,5))+0.25∗(5∗BlueFail{4,2}(3,5))
+0.25∗(5∗BlueFail{4,2}(4,5));
341 c4 3 = 0.25∗(3∗BlueFail{4,3}(1,5))+0.25∗(3∗BlueFail{4,3}(2,5))+0.25∗(3∗BlueFail{4,3}(3,5))
+0.25∗(3∗BlueFail{4,3}(4,5));
c4 4 = 3∗BlueFail{4,4}(2,3);
343 c4 5 = 0.145∗(1.5∗BlueFail{4,5}(3,2))+0.145∗(1.5∗BlueFail{4,5}(3,3))+0.355∗(1.5∗BlueFail
{4,5}(4,2))+0.355∗(1.5∗BlueFail{4,5}(4,3));
345 c = [c1 1 c1 2 c1 3 c1 4 c1 5 c2 1 c2 2 c2 3 c2 4 c2 5 c3 1 c3 2 c3 3 c3 4 c3 5 c4 1 c4 2 c4 3
c4 4 c4 5 ]’;
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Appendix K. MATLAB - Stochastic Game Model
1 %% Stochastic model assuming NE is maintained at each stage game no matter
%% the values assigned to actions.
3
%% Pull in game data from StochGameData.m file
5 StochGameData;
7 %% Create transition matrix symbolically
[n,m] = size(BluePayoffs);
9 n = n+1;
m = m+1;
11 P = sym(zeros(n∗m, n∗m));
for i = 1 : size (BMNE,1)
13 for j = 1 : size (BMNE,2)−1
begin = (i−1)∗m;
15 if begin+j < 24
P(begin+j, begin+j+1) = (1 − BMNE(i,j)) ∗ RMNE(i,j);
17 P(begin+j, begin+j+m) = BMNE(i,j) ∗ (1−RMNE(i,j));
P(begin+j, begin+j+m+1) = BMNE(i,j) ∗ RMNE(i,j);
19 else
end
21 end
end
23
for i = 1 : size (P,1)
25 P(i, i ) = 1 − sum(P(i,:));
end
27
%% Evaluate transition probabilities by substituting variables with values assigned in
StochGameData.m
29 P = eval(subs(P));
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31 %% Initial state vector, initialize stationary proportions
PI (1,:) = [1,zeros(1,29) ];
33
%% Set number of runs
35 runCount = 40;
for i = 2:runCount
37 %% Iterate to find stationary probabilities
PI(i ,:) = PI(1,:)∗(Pˆi);
39 end
41 %% Plot the results
plot (1:runCount,PI)
43 xlabel( ’Time Steps’)
ylabel( ’Probability ’ )
45 title ( ’Stationary Probabilities ’ )
47 %% Find transient state matrix
Q = [P(1:5,1:5),P(1:5,7:11) , P(1:5,13:17) , P(1:5,19:23) ; P(7:11,1:5) ,P(7:11,7:11) , P(7:11,13:17)
, P(7:11,19:23) ; P(13:17,1:5) , P(13:17,7:11) , P(13:17, 13:17), P(13:17,19:23); P(19:23,1:5)
, P(19:23,7:11) , P(19:23,13:17), P(19:23,19:23) ];
49
%% Find expected total number of time periods spent in state j given starting in state i
51 M = inv((eye(size(Q)) − Q));
53 %% Find probability of ever transitioning to state j given starting in state i
F = zeros(size(M));
55 for i = 1 : size (M,1)
for j = 1 : size (M,2)
57 F(i , j) = M(i,j)/M(j,j);
end
59 end
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61 %% Find cost from state i to state j
indiv (:,:) = zeros(size(M));
63 for i = 1 : size (M,1)
for j = 1 : size (M,2)
65 indiv( i , j) = M(i,j)∗c(j ,1) ;
end
67 end
69 %% Display results
P
71 PI(runCount, :)
Q
73 M
F
75 indiv
77 %% Estimated total cost given start in state i , based on network architecture
C = M∗c
79 Total = sum(C)
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Appendix L. LINGO - Integer Program Formulation
SETS:
RED_ACTIONS/1..21/: D;
BLUE_ACTIONS/1..14/: COST_REPAIR, COST_UPGRADE, X, Y, Z, TOTAL_REPAIR, TOTAL_UPGRADE, TOTAL_DN;
PROBS(BLUE_ACTIONS,RED_ACTIONS): REPAIR_UTIL, UPGRADE_UTIL, MSNE, DN_UTIL;
ENDSETS
DATA:
REPAIR_UTIL = 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0 0 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 0 0 0
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.05 0.2 0.3 0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.4 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
0.3 0.1 0.2 0 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.4 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 0.1 0 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0 0 0
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0 0.3 0.7 0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 0.7 0.7 0.1 0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0 0
0 0 0 0.6 0 0 0.7 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.5 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0.7 0 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 0 0 0
0.05 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.5 0.2 0 0.05 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3
0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.7 0.1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.6 ;
UPGRADE_UTIL = 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0 0 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0 0 0
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2
0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.1 0 0 0.3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0.3 0.4 0 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0 0.3 0.7 0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.4 0.7 0.8 0.2 0 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0 0.2 0 0
0 0 0 0.7 0 0 0.6 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0
0.3 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5 0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.8 0 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.4 0 0 0
0.2 0 0 0 0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0 0.3 0.2 0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.4
0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.8 0.3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 0.8 ;
D = 1 2 2 5 4 3 3 3.5 5 6 5 8 5 3 2.5 5 3 3 2 1.5 1.5 ;
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MSNE = 1 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.286 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.5
0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.714 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0.125 0 0 0 0.125 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.375 0 0 0 0.375 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2
0.6231 0 0 0.3069 0 0 0 0 0 0.3071 0 0.1026 0 0.2652 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2
0 0 0 0 0.812 0 0.0348 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2
0.0469 0 0 0.0231 0 0 0 0 0 0.0068 0 0.0023 0 0.0059 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2
0 0 0 0 0.6188 0 0.2652 0 0 0.1411 0 0.0472 0 0.1219 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0.145 0.145
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0.355 0.355 ;
COST_REPAIR = 4 2 1 3 4 2.5 5 0.75 1.5 2 1.3 1.5 1 1 ;
COST_UPGRADE = 7 3 2 2 4 6 8 2 8 5 1.5 1 1 1 ;
EFFECT_LVL = 0.8;
ENDDATA
!OBJECTIVE FUNCTION: sum of Blue utilities based on decision made;
MAX = @SUM(PROBS(I,J): REPAIR_UTIL(I,J)*(X(I)+EFFECT_LVL*Z(I))+UPGRADE_UTIL(I,J)*Y(I));
!SUCH THAT:;
!calculate total repair cost per blue action;
@FOR(BLUE_ACTIONS(I) : TOTAL_REPAIR(I)=(COST_REPAIR(I) + @SUM(RED_ACTIONS(J):(1-REPAIR_UTIL(I,J))*MSNE(I,J)*D(J))));
!calculate total upgrade cost per blue action;
@FOR(BLUE_ACTIONS(I) : TOTAL_UPGRADE(I)=(COST_UPGRADE(I) + @SUM(RED_ACTIONS(J):(1-UPGRADE_UTIL(I,J))*MSNE(I,J)*D(J))));
!calculate total cost of no action;
@FOR(BLUE_ACTIONS(I) : TOTAL_DN(I)= @SUM(RED_ACTIONS(J):(1-(EFFECT_LVL*REPAIR_UTIL(I,J)))*MSNE(I,J)*D(J)));
!restrict decision to either repair, upgrade, do nothing for each action;
@FOR(BLUE_ACTIONS(I): X(I)+Y(I)+Z(I) = 1);
!cost threshold;
@SUM(BLUE_ACTIONS(I): TOTAL_REPAIR(I)*X(I) + TOTAL_UPGRADE(I)*Y(I) + TOTAL_DN(I)*Z(I)) <= 70;
!choice variables must be binary;
@FOR(BLUE_ACTIONS(I): @BIN(X(I)));
@FOR(BLUE_ACTIONS(I): @BIN(Y(I)));
!provide output for utilities of no action;
@FOR(PROBS(I,J) : DN_UTIL = EFFECT_LVL * REPAIR_UTIL(I,J));
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